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Abstract
A person’s friends, neighbours and other social relationships can
have a large impact on their economic outcomes. We examine three
important ways that networks can affect people’s lives: when networks
describe who they communicate with, who they can trust, and who
benefits from their public good provision. We analyse information
transmission in networks in a new, intuitive way which removes the
problematic redundancy of double counting the signals that travel
through more than one walk between nodes. Two-connectedness and
cycles of length four play an important role in whether players are
‘visible’, which means that other players can communicate about
them.
Next, using this approach to network communication, we investigate
cooperation and punishment in a society where information flows
about cheating are determined by an arbitrary fixed network. We
identify which players can trust and cooperate with each other in a
repeated game where members of a community are randomly matched
in pairs. Our model shows how two aspects of trust depend on players’
network position: they are ‘trusting’ if they are more likely to receive
information about other players’ types; and they are ‘trusted’ if others
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can communicate about them, giving them strong incentives not to
deviate.
Lastly, in networks with private provision of public goods, we show
that a ‘neutral’ policy corresponds to a switch in the direction of
the impact of income redistribution. Where redistribution is non-
neutral, we can identify the welfare effects of transfers, including
whether or not Pareto-improving transfers are possible. If not, we
find the implicit welfare weights of the original equilibrium. In this
setting, we also identify a transfer paradox, where, counter-intuitively,
a transfer of wealth between economic agents can result in the giver
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In our first chapter, we identify a new approach to finding the probabilities of
information transmission between nodes in a fixed network, which removes the
problem of double counting of signals. Our approach, using De Morgan’s laws,
is a closed-form function that is simple to calculate and can use any value for
the primitive probability that a signal passes between neighbouring nodes in the
network. We introduce the concept of ‘obstruction’ by allowing nodes to decline
to pass on the signals that may travel through the network links. If a node cannot
prevent any other nodes from communicating by obstructing signals, we call that
node ‘visible’. A sufficient condition for a node to be visible is that it is a member
of a cycle of length four. We also find new centrality measures that depend on
the word-of-mouth probabilities and obstruction.
In our second chapter, we investigate cooperation in networks. Community
enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated
games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about
players’ reputations spreads to their future partners through links in the social
network. We find that information supports cooperation by increasing trust
between players, and obtain the ‘radius of trust’: an endogenous network listing
the potentially cooperative relationships between pairs of players in a community.
We identify two aspects of trust. Players are trusted if others can communicate
about them, which we link to 2-connectedness of the network and the length of
cycles within it. Players are trusting if they are more likely to receive information
from others through their network connections; this is linked to word-of-mouth
centrality.
In our final chapter, we move from a decentralised model to a centralised one,
investigating the welfare implications of income redistribution on an economy
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Introduction
with privately provided public goods in networks. First, we provide a new
perspective on the neutrality result by showing that it corresponds to a change
of policy direction. Next, we characterise the effects of income redistribution on
social welfare, identifying conditions for Pareto-improving transfers. If these are
not available, we find the implicit welfare weights of the initial equilibrium. We






1. Word-of-mouth communication in networks
1.1 Introduction
There are many different ways that information can flow in networks (Borgatti,
2005), depending on the nature of the information and the updating approach
used by individuals. While Bayesian updating is the standard approach in
complete networks, for arbitrary networks the inferences become rather complex,
and behavioural approaches are often used.1 We tackle this complexity by
focusing on the transmission of signals, rather than beliefs.2 This approach allows
us to find the probabilities of information transmission between the nodes of any
network, allowing Bayesian updating even in complex networks.
This chapter develops a new closed-form expression for the probabilities of
node-to-node information transmission by diffusion, where neighbours may or
may not pass signals to each other along walks of limited length (Banerjee,
Chandrasekhar, Duflo and Jackson, 2013). We use the term word-of-mouth for our
probabilities of information transmission between nodes, capturing the intuitive
concept whereby information travels within a community via conversations
between players and their connections (Ahn and Suominen, 2001; Lippert and
Spagnolo, 2011).
We also show how the word-of-mouth probabilities are affected if players
choose not to pass on messages, an action which we call obstruction. To do
so we assume that information is ‘hard’ or ‘evidentiary’ (Nava, 2016; Wolitzky,
2014), so that nodes can choose whether or not to pass on messages. We find
1Degroot (1974); Golub and Jackson (2012); Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015); Goyal (2016);
Levy and Razin (2014).
2In other settings, Hagenbach and Koessler (2010), Galeotti et al. (2013) and Acemoglu
et al. (2014) also focus on transmission of signals in networks, using the cheap talk framework
of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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that a node who is part of a cycle of length four is ‘visible’ in the sense that he
cannot prevent any two other nodes in the network from communicating, if he
chooses to obstruct messages.
A closely related measure to word-of-mouth centrality is diffusion centrality,
developed by Banerjee et al. (2013) as an approximation of their epidemiological
simulation measure, communication centrality. As a simple approximation,
diffusion centrality implicitly assumes that the probabilities that a signal travels
along each walk in the network are independent. With diffusion, a player may
receive the same signal more than once along different walks in the network, and
diffusion centrality measures the expected total number of times information is
transmitted between nodes. As an aggregate measure, diffusion centrality suffers
from the problem of double counting: the same signal is counted again when
it is transmitted along different walks.3 While maintaining the independence
assumption, our word-of-mouth approach presents an improvement on diffusion
centrality, using De Morgan’s laws to remove the problem of double counting.
This means that we can describe whether or not a signal is received along these
different walks, allowing for Bayesian updating in networks.
Diffusion centrality has been found to have empirical relevance (Breza and
Chandrasekhar, 2015; Fafchamps and Labonne, 2016), and our word-of-mouth
probabilities may be easier to work with in an empirical context since they
lie between zero and one (so no transformation is required) and they can be
calculated for any value of the probability that two neighbours talk. For diffusion
centrality, this value is given by the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the
3This problem is related to but distinct from correlation neglect, where players observe the
same signal more than once through different walks in the network and erroneously treat each
report as a distinct signal.
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network’s adjacency matrix.
We find that removing double counting reduces the inequality of centrality
between nodes in the network. Central nodes have high diffusion centrality
because they receive so many signals. But word-of-mouth centrality takes account
of the fact many of these signals may be redundant, because the information could
already have been received by another route. By reducing the relative centrality
of the most central nodes in a network, the word-of-mouth approach reduces the
overall inequality in centrality. Arguably, counting the total number of times
a signal is transmitted, may be more appropriate in investigating questions of
influence, rather than information.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 defines the probabilities of
information transmission in networks, and Section 1.3 illustrates the approach on
networks with homophily and segregation. Section 1.4 introduces the concept of
obstruction and its consequences, and Section 1.5 provides some new centrality
measures based on the word-of-mouth probabilities. Section 1.6 describes the
literature on information transmission in networks and possible applications.
1.2 Word-of-mouth probabilities
In this section, we show how the fixed information network that connects
the players can provide us with the node-to-node probabilities of information
transmission.
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1.2.1 The information network
The n players in N = {1, ..., n} occupy the nodes of a fixed undirected unweighted
information network g such that {i, j} ∈ g if i and j are neighbours. A walk
of length a between two nodes i and j in network g is a sequence of nodes
(i = x0, x1, ..., xa−1, xa = j) such that for every r ∈ {1, 2, ..., a}, we have that
{xr−1, xr} ∈ g. If the nodes are distinct, the sequence is a path, and if in addition
i = j, it is a cycle. Let G = [gij] be the adjacency matrix of the network g,
where gij = 1 indicates that players i and j are neighbours so {i, j} ∈ g, and
gij = 0 otherwise (and gii = 0 ∀i ∈ N by convention). The network G is common
knowledge; all players know each other’s network positions. Let Ni = {j : gij = 1}
be the set of player i’s neighbours and |Ni| be i’s degree.
Let dij(G) be the social distance — the length of the shortest path — between
two players i and j in the network G. Let DG = max{dij(G)} be the diameter of
the network G: the length of the longest shortest path between any two players.
Two players are connected if there exists a path of finite length between them,
and a network is connected if all players are connected to each other. If G is
not connected, its diameter is infinite. Let G−k be the adjacency matrix of the
network with player k removed — that is, the n × n adjacency matrix created
when all the entries in the kth row and column of G are set to zero. If G−k
is connected then the network is 2-connected with respect to k; the network is
2-connected if it is 2-connected with respect to all players.
16
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1.2.2 Information transmission by diffusion
Diffusion is a structure of information transmission defined by Banerjee et al.
(2013), where a signal flows through each link in the information network with a
fixed probability, up to a maximum number of links.
Definition 1. Diffusion (Banerjee et al., 2013) is a process whereby information
flows through the network with probability p ∈ (0, 1] along each link, up to a
maximum T links. The probability of information flowing along each walk in the
network is independent.4
The parameter p denotes how likely players are to meet and/or exchange
information with their neighbours. For example, if p = 1 and T = 1, information
is passed with certainty only to a player’s direct neighbours. Let Ω denote the
information structure of the network such that Ω = {p, T,G}.
1.2.3 Word-of-mouth probabilities
We focus on the simple case of just one binary signal, which is either transmitted
or not — and either received or not. In this section we do not allow nodes to
conceal signals by not passing them on to their neighbours; this is considered in
the next section.
Let si ∈ {{1}, 6©} be the signal emitted by node i, and ρj ∈ {{1}, 6©} be the
signal received by node j. We define the word-of-mouth probability wij(Ω) as the
4This independence is implicitly assumed in Banerjee et al. (2013) and is achieved with
the following assumptions: a signal is emitted by the source in each round of information
transmission; players pass on each signal they receive independently of whether they receive
any other signals; and players do not store information after passing it on to their neighbours,
so that the only information players recall after the information transmission process has ended,
is that which arrived in the final round of information transmission.
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Figure 1.1: Example of diffusion
probability that a signal emitted by i will reach j.
Pr [ρj = 1 | si] =

wij(Ω) if si = 1
0 if si = 6©
∀i, j ∈ N (1.2.1)
To calculate these probabilities, we need a way to account for the fact that a
pair of players may be connected to each other by several walks in the network
and as such, may transmit a signal via more than one of these walks. To deal
with this issue, we use De Morgan’s laws of duality (Fuente, 2000). One of these
laws states that for a family of sets A = {Ai; i ∈ I} in the universal set X, where
I is some index set, we have that ∼ (∪i∈IAi) = ∩i∈I(∼ Ai).5 In other words, the
complement of wij(Ω) is given by the probability that j does not hear a signal
from i along any of the walks that connect i and j in G.
Take for example the network in Figure 1.1, where we would like to find w14,
5With two events and using logic notation, this law can be written as ¬(A∪B) = ¬A∩¬B.
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the probability that a signal emitted by node 1 will be received by node 4. Let
us set T = 2. There are two walks of length ≤ T that a signal could pass from 1
to 4: those via 2 and 3. Each are of length 2, so a signal can pass along each of
them with probability p2. Adding these two probabilities together would give the
bilateral6 entry of diffusion centrality: d14 = p
2 +p2. But this is not a probability
of node-to-node information transmission, because we need to take account of the
fact that the signal could travel along both walks. This happens with probability
p4 because the probability of information flowing along each of these walks is
independent. So we find that w14 = p
2 +p2−p4. We can also get this result using
De Morgan’s laws where 1− w14 = (1− p2)(1− p2).
For a more general formula, we know that for each walk of length τ , the
probability that the signal does not travel along all the links in that walk by
diffusion is 1− pτ . For a signal not to travel from i to j, we need a signal not to
travel along every possible walk that connects i to j in G, of length ≤ T .7 Let
lij(τ,G) be the number of walks between i and j of length τ in the network G.
Definition 2. Word-of-mouth probability given by wij(Ω) is the probability
that a signal passes from i to j by diffusion, given in Definition 1. For any Ω,
that is, for any p ∈ (0, 1], any T and any G, we have that












7In parallel work, Ambrus, Chandrasekhar and Elliott (2014) use the inclusion-exclusion
principle to tackle a similar problem in a different context.
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Where lij(τ,G) = [G
τ ]ij. This applies ∀i 6= j ∈ N , while wii(Ω) = 1.
Note that we have assumed that G is symmetric, which means that ingoing
and outgoing probabilities of word-of-mouth communication are identical. This
could be easily modified for a directed network. Let us say that players can
communicate if there is a positive probability that a signal sent by one of them
will be received by the other. Let us also say that a network is informative if
every pair of players in the network can communicate.
1.2.3.1 Independence
Note that Definition 2 only holds if information flows as set out in Definition 1
apply; in particular, if the assumption that the probability of a signal travelling
along each walk in the network is independent holds. Let us take this opportunity
to reflect on the independence assumption. Consider the network in Figure 1.1,
with node 6 removed, and w45, the probability that a signal emitted by node 4
is received by node 5. There are two walks of length 3 between them: {4, 2, 1, 5}
and {4, 3, 1, 5}. With the independence assumption, the two walks can be treated
independently, so we have that w15 = 1− (1− p3)(1− p3) = 2p3 − p6.
We can see that node 1 could receive the signal from 4 through two walks,
either via nodes 2 or 3. With independence, he would treat these two signals
separately. But a more accurate specification might be that there would only be
one opportunity for 1 to pass this signal to 5 or not. In this case, w45 = pw41 =
p(1− (1−p2)(1−p2)) = 2p3−p5. This result can also be found as the probability
that the 3 links in each walk are activated separately, minus the probability that
all 5 links in both walks are activated. This would be the kind of result generated
by Banerjee et al. (2013)’s algorithm of communication centrality. This example
20
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shows that there is a small loss in precision due to the independence assumption.
Arguably, this is offset by a much easier and quicker computation of the word-of-
mouth probabilities as an approximation of this communication mechanism.
1.2.4 The information structure
Next we examine how the three aspects of the information structure Ω affect the
probabilities of information transmission.
Proposition 1. There are complementarities between the three aspects of the
information structure Ω for the word-of-mouth probabilities given in Definition
2. In particular, it holds that
1. wij(Ω) is increasing in p if and only if ∃ τ ≤ T such that lij(τ,G) ≥ 1
2. wij(Ω) increases as T increases to T + 1 if and only if lij(T + 1,G) ≥ 1
3. wij(Ω) increases as a link is added to G if and only if the new link leads to
an increase in lij(τ,G) for any τ ≤ T
An increase in p or T or an additional link in G cannot lead to a decrease in any
obstructed word-of-mouth probabilities.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that, as would be expected, a network with more links,
greater probability of players transmitting messages to their neighbours, and more
rounds for information to travel, could have higher probabilities of information
transmission. The following Remark shows how the players’ communication
depends on social distance, the diameter of the network and the furthest distance
that information can travel.
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Remark 1.2.1. It holds that:
• for i, j such that dij(G) ≤ T , we have wij(Ω) ≥ pdij(G) > 0; and
• For i, j such that dij(G) > T , we have wij(Ω) = 0.
This implies that:
• If G is connected and DG ≤ T , then wij(Ω) ≥ pDG > 0 ∀i, j and the
network is informative;
• If, in addition p = 1, then wij(Ω) = 1 ∀ i, j, and there is perfect
information; and
• If G is not connected, then ∀i ∃ j such that wij(Ω) = 0.
• If dij > T ∀ i, j then wij(Ω) = 0 ∀i, j
Corollary 1. For any pair of nodes {i, j} in any network, if p < 1, there exists
an upper bound P∗ij < 1 on their word-of-mouth probability, with respect to T .
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that as T increases, it becomes possible
for a signal to travel between two nodes using longer and longer walks. But the
probability of information travelling through all the links in a long walk is low,
because it depends on pT . In fact, the incremental effect of increasing T on the
word-of-mouth probabilities converges to zero at high T . So the most important
factor affecting the magnitude of the word-of-mouth probabilities is the number
of short walks between players.
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Following on from this, the existence of a lower bound pdij(G) begs the question
as to what might lead to a divergence between this lower bound and wij(Ω). If
dij(G) = T , then wij(Ω) = p
dij(G) if there is only one walk of length T between
i and j, and increases above the lower bound as the number of walks of length
T between i and j increases. Next, if the social distance pdij(G) < T , there will
probably be other walks between i and j of length less than T . More walks of
length ≤ T will increase the divergence between wij(Ω) and pdij(G). The greater
the difference between T and the social distance between i and j, the more likely
there will be more shorter walks between them. In all cases, the more walks
there are of lengths less than T between nodes, the more ways there are for those
nodes to transmit information between them, and the greater divergence expected
between the lower bound pdij(G) and wij(Ω). As described above, shorter walks
have higher probability of communication and so have a bigger impact on this
divergence.
1.2.5 Example networks: line and star
Next, let us show the of word-of-mouth probabilities in two example networks, the
line and the star, shown in Figure 1.2. With parameters of p = 0.15 and T = 6,
23

















Figure 1.2: Line and star networks of eight nodes
the word-of-mouth probabilities between the eight nodes in the line network are:
wij(Ω) =

1 0.156 0.024 0.004 0.001 0+ 0+ 0
0.156 1 0.159 0.025 0.004 0.0010 0+ 0+
0.024 0.159 1 0.159 0.025 0.004 0.001 0+
0.004 0.025 0.159 1 0.159 0.025 0.004 0.001
0.001 0.004 0.025 0.159 1 0.159 0.025 0.004
0+ 0.001 0.004 0.025 0.159 1 0.159 0.024
0+ 0+ 0.001 0.004 0.025 0.159 1 0.156
0 0+ 0+ 0.001 0.004 0.024 0.156 1

(1.2.2)
As would be expected, these decrease for further-away nodes, becoming
negligible at a social distance of five links. Meanwhile the probabilities are higher
than the lower bound determined by the social distance between nodes, e.g. the
probability of communication between nodes 2 and 3 is 0.159, higher than p,
24
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which is 0.15. The reverberation of the message in the network increases the
probability that it will eventually arrive.
Due to symmetry, there are only two word-of-mouth probabilities in the star.
The probability that a signal emitted by the centre of the star will be received
by a node on the periphery is 0.173. The probability that a signal emitted by
one periphery node will be received by the other is 0.027. Note that the highest
probability that a signal will travel a walk of length 1 is 0.159 in the line and
0.173 in the star; and for a walk of length 2 it is 0.025 and 0.027 respectively.
With p = 0.15 and so p2 = 0.0225, we can see that there is greater divergence
between wij(Ω) and p
dij(G) in the star network than the line. This is because, as
discussed above, the network structure of the star allows for a greater number of
short walks between nodes.
1.3 Word-of-mouth probabilities in networks
with homophily
Having found the word-of-mouth probabilities in the general case, next we can
illustrate the case when networks exhibit homophily (Currarini et al., 2009; Golub
and Jackson, 2012). Homophily, which is closely related to segregation, is when
nodes are more likely to be connected to others who are similar to them —
members of their own group — rather than to members of other groups. To
examine homophily in our case, we use the approach of equitable partition and
the quotient graph.
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1.3.1 Equitable partition and quotient graph
Definition 3. Equitable partition (Powers and Sulaiman, 1982). Each node in
one group must have the same number of links to nodes in the other group. Recall
that Ni = {j : gij = 1} be the set of player i’s neighbours and |Ni| be i’s degree.
A partition π = {C1, ..., CH} of agents in a network is an equitable partition if,
when agents i and j belong to the same type h,
| Ni ∩ Ch |=| Nj ∩ Ch | ∀ h = 1, ..., H
Definition 4. Quotient graph (Powers and Sulaiman, 1982). An equitable
partition can be represented by a quotient graph gπ and its H × H adjacency
matrix Gπ, whose ij th entry is | Ni ∩Cj |. The indicator matrix C is an n×H
matrix, which denotes the membership of each of the n agents in each of the H
groups with a 1 if they are a member and a zero if not. G and Gπ are related by
GC = CGπ.
The quotient graph plays an important role in the study of the main part of
the spectrum M since it holds that
M ⊂ spec(Gπ) ⊂ spec(G) (1.3.1)
Godsil (1993) (Lemma 2.2, Chapter 5) shows that if Y is an equitable partition
of Z, then if (λ,x) is an eigenpair of Y , then (λ,Cx) is an eigenpair of Z. This
is known as ‘lifting’ the eigenvectors. We note that this approach could be used
to transform any n× 1 vector of characteristics of each agent to a H × 1 vector
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of characteristics of each partitioned group.
If there are just two groups labelled A and B, of sizes a and b respectively,
then the adjacency matrix G can be partitioned as follows, where GAA is the





Meanwhile the entries in the quotient graph Gπ denote how many links their





Where α and β are the number of links within each group A and B respectively,
γ is the number of links that any node in A has to nodes in group B, and δ is
the number of links that any node in B has to nodes in group A (γ and δ are
not necessarily the same, even in an undirected matrix, as long as a and b are
different).
From Definition 1.3.3 we can also observe that the exponent of the adjacency
matrix, which we have used to identify the number of walks of different lengths,
can also be found from the exponent of quotient graph and the indicator matrix.
That is, from GC = CGπ we have that G
τC = CGτπ. Hence, we can see that
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the entries in Gτπ are
Gτπ =









j∈A lij(τ,G) for each i ∈ A, that is, the total number
of walks of length τ from any node in A to all other nodes in A. Due to equitable
partition this total is the same for every member of A. Note this is a total number
of walks: when comparing different pairs of nodes in the same or different groups,
they may have more or fewer walks between them, but the total number of walks
of each length that a node has to all nodes in a particular group is the same,
when aggregating over all the nodes in the relevant group. This is due to the
assumption of equitable partition: different nodes may or may not be connected
to each other in G but the total number of connections that a node has to a
particular group is the same.
1.3.2 Homophily
Now we can use the quotient graph approach to examine the word-of-mouth
probabilities in an example case of homophily with two groups. Let us consider
a network with symmetry in relation to the number of links between and within
groups. That is, from (1.3.3) we have that α = β is the number of links within
groups and γ = δ is the number of links between groups. If there is homophily
and segregation, nodes are more likely to have links with their own group than
with outsiders, and we have that α > γ. We can now observe that the exponent
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Hence in this symmetric case, the total number of walks within and between
















[(α + γ)τ − (α− γ)τ ] (1.3.7)
According to the equations above, the number of walks between each pair of
nodes depends on both α and γ, both within and between groups. We noted
above that homophily implies that α > γ. As the difference between α and γ
increases, we find that the number of links between groups becomes less important
in determining the number of walks in the network. In particular, let γ = xα,
with x < 1. In this case we can rewrite the above equations, and observe that as
x gets very small and the network becomes more segregated, we can approximate
the number of walks of length τ as follows.
1
2
[ατ (1 + x)τ + ατ (1− x)τ ] ≈ ατ (1.3.8)
1
2
[ατ (1 + x)τ − ατ (1− x)τ ] ≈ 0 (1.3.9)
So for a segregated society, the number of walks of each length, and hence the
word-of-mouth probabilities, can be approximated by looking only at the number
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of walks within each group. This recalls a result by Allouch (2017) that nodes’
Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987) in segregated networks can be approximated
by their Bonacich centrality within their own group, because adding an extra step
to a walk inside a group will most likely reach a member of the same group.
1.3.3 Complete bipartite networks
In the complete bipartite network, the two groups, A and B, are not connected
within the group and are completely connected to all nodes in the other group.
For example, the star network results when one of the groups contains only one
node. As described in the previous section, the divergence between the word-of-
mouth probabilities and their lower bound is due to the number of short walks.
For complete bipartite networks, the number of walks of different lengths depends
on the group sizes.
As above the two groups have sizes a and b respectively, so that n = a + b.
Now in (1.3.3) we have that α = β = 0, γ = b and δ = a. As before, we can
find the total number of walks between and within groups as follows. As may
be expected, there is a repeating pattern for walks of even and odd lengths. Let
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 if τ is odd
, r ∈ [0, R]
(1.3.10)
These are the total number of walks that a node in one group has with all nodes
in a particular group, as shown in (1.3.4). Our formula for the word-of-mouth
probabilities requires the number of walks of length τ between any two nodes i
and j. To find this from the matrices using the quotient graph in (1.3.10) in a
complete bipartite network, we need to divide by a if j is in group A (the first
column) and divide by b if j is in group B (the second column). From (1.3.10)
we can obtain the following results for walks of odd length, where τ = 2r + 1.
• If i, j are in the same group, lij(τ,G) = 0
• If i, j are in different groups, lij(τ,G) = (ab)r = (ab)
τ−1
2
Whereas for walks of even length where τ = 2r, (1.3.10) shows that
• If i, j are in different groups, lij(τ,G) = 0
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We can now calculate the word-of-mouth probabilities. Let wab(Ω) be the
probability of information transmission by word-of-mouth between distinct nodes
in groups A and B, and waa(Ω) and wbb(Ω) be the probabilities of information
transmission between distinct nodes within groups A and B respectively. The
word-of-mouth probabilities are:






















The multiplicative formulation for the number of walks suggests that for a given
overall population, there are more walks of each length if group sizes are more
similar to each other, than if the group sizes are very unequal, e.g. in the star
network. We can check this using the above formulation. This gives us the
following result.
Remark 1.3.1. The total number of walks in a complete bipartite network of
two equal-sized groups is strictly greater than that in a star network, for any walk
length and n > 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given these results and Remark 1.3.1, we would expect that the probabilities
of information transmission by word-of-mouth would be higher in the case of two
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equal-sized groups than in the star. We can easily find the expressions for these
probabilities of word-of-mouth information transmission in these two example
networks as follows. For two equal groups of size n
2
, we have two probabilities of
information transmission: between distinct nodes in the same group, ws(Ω) and
between nodes in different groups wd(Ω). For the star, the two probabilities of
information transmission are that between the core and periphery nodes wcp(Ω),



























We can now illustrate the effects on these probabilities as T or n increases.
Figure 1.3 shows these probabilities in the two networks, with the chart on the
left showing the word-of-mouth probabilities of information transmission between
nodes with social distance one: that is, between the two groups, or between the
core and periphery of the star, and the lower bound of p. The chart on the
right shows the probabilities between nodes with social distance two: that is,
within the same group and between periphery nodes in the star, as well as the
lower bound of p2. It is clear that word-of-mouth probabilities in the complete
bipartite network are indeed higher for the two equal groups than for the star.
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Figure 1.3: Word-of-mouth probabilities for two types of complete bipartite
network with n = 8, as total number of rounds of information transmission (T)
increases.
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Figure 1.4: Word-of-mouth probabilities for two types of complete bipartite
network with T = 6, as total number of nodes n increases.
The divergence between wij(Ω) and p
dij(G) is lower in the star. Figure 1.3 also
shows the probabilities converge to some upper bound for large T , as described
in Corollary 1.
The proof of Remark 1.3.1 shows that the divergence in the number of walks
between the star and the network of two equal groups follows a quadratic function
in n, the total number of nodes. Figure 1.4 shows the divergence between the
word-of-mouth probabilities in the two difference types of network increasing
with a quadratic shape as n increases. As would be expected, the probabilities
converge to 1 as n increases: the limits of the probabilities as n→∞ are 1. This
does not imply that larger group sizes are better for word-of-mouth information
transmission though: we are adding many more links than nodes as n increases
due to the complete bipartite structure. In particular, if two new nodes are added,
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this requires n new links in the network. If the numbers of links change at a very
different rate to the size of the population, arguably it is not possible to draw a
comparison between group sizes.
1.4 Obstruction and visibility
In this section we build on the word-of-mouth probabilities by allowing nodes to
choose whether to pass on information or not. To model this we assume that
information is ‘hard’ or ‘evidentiary’ (Nava, 2016; Wolitzky, 2014), in the sense
that nodes can choose to conceal information, but not modify it. If they do not
pass it on, we call this obstruction.
Definition 5. Obstructed diffusion is a process whereby information flows
through the network with adjacency matrix G with probability p ∈ (0, 1]
along each link, up to a maximum T links. Information is evidentiary and the
probability of information flowing along each walk in the network is independent.
The network links, through which a signal can flow by obstructed diffusion,
include only those nodes who choose not to obstruct it in that round of
information transmission.
The wider structure of a network game, where nodes can either obstruct
information or not, would provide the incentives for choosing obstruction. Nodes
may have incentives to obstruct signals in different rounds of the information
transmission process – so a different subset of nodes could choose to obstruct
certain signals in each of the T rounds. We show here the simplest example, of
obstruction by a single player in all rounds of the game — but the same approach
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could be used for more complex obstruction patterns (shown in the Appendix).
In this chapter we do not focus on the incentives in a game that would lead a
player to obstruct the signal — simply on the probabilities that would result if
he did so. Chapter 2 provides an interesting application of such a case.
1.4.1 Obstructed word-of-mouth probabilities
Let pij(k,Ω) be the obstructed word-of-mouth probability that a signal emitted
by player i will be received by player j, when it is obstructed by player k. We
calculate these probabilities in the same way as the word-of-mouth probabilities,
except we use the network G−k to calculate the number of walks, since player k
will not pass on the signal. Let lij(τ,G−k) be the number of walks between i and
j of length τ in the network G−k.
Let si(k) ∈ {{1}, 6©} be the signal that player i sends that is obstructed
by player k, and let ρj(k) ∈ {{1}, 6©} be the signal that j receives that is
obstructed by k. We define the probability of information transmission pij(k)
as the probability that a signal emitted by i obstructed by k will reach j.
Pr [ρj(k) = 1 | si(k)] =

pij(k) if si(k) = 1
0 if si(k) = 6©
∀i, j, k ∈ N (1.4.1)
Definition 6. Obstructed word-of-mouth probability given by pij(k,Ω) is
the probability that a signal passes from i to j by obstructed diffusion given in
Definition 5, when the signal is obstructed by k. For any Ω, that is, for any
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p ∈ [0, 1], any T and any G, we have that





Where lij(τ,G−k) = [G
τ
−k]ij. This applies ∀i 6= j, k ∈ N , while pii(k,Ω) = 1.
Note that pij(k,Ω) = 0 if i = k or j = k. Proposition 1 and Remark 1.2.1,
which describe the effects of the information structure Ω and social distance on
information transmission probabilities, both apply to the case with obstruction,
if we replace G with G−k. Since G has weakly more links than G−k, from
Proposition 1, we have that wij(Ω) ≥ pij(k,Ω) ∀i, j, k.
1.4.2 Visibility
We have shown that if player i emits a signal that is obstructed by player k, the
probabilities that the signal is received by other nodes are determined by player
i’s position in G−k, the network omitting k. Recall that nodes can communicate
if there is a positive probability that a signal sent by one of them will be received
by the other. We now define the concept of visibility in networks.
Definition 7. A node is visible if and only if everyone can still communicate,
even when he is obstructing the signal. That is, player k is visible iff pij(k,Ω) >
0 ∀ i, j ∈ N \ k.
We can rewrite Remark 1.2.1 for the case when player k obstructs the signal.
Remark 1.4.1. It holds that:
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• For i, j such that dij(G−k) ≤ T , we have that pij(k,Ω) ≥ pdij(G−k) > 0
• For i, j such that dij(G−k) > T , we have that pij(k,Ω) = 0
This implies that:
• If G−k is connected and DG−k ≤ T , then pij(k,Ω) ≥ p
DG−k > 0 ∀i, j and
player k is visible.
• If the network is 2-connected and maxk∈N{DG−k} ≤ T , all nodes are visible.
• If, in addition, p = 1, then pij(k,Ω) = 1 ∀ i, j, k, and there is perfect
information.
• If G−k is not connected, then ∀i ∃ j such that pij(k,Ω) = 0
Visibility depends on what the network looks like when a node is absent i.e.
the structure of G−k. It requires two things for k to be visible. First, G−k
must be connected, because a visible player does not disconnect the network by
his absence, i.e. if G−k is connected then G is 2-connected with respect to k.
Secondly, the diameter of G−k must be not be greater than T , the maximum
distance a signal can travel.8
1.4.3 Obstructiveness
A comparison between word-of-mouth probabilities and obstructed word-of-
mouth probabilities gives us a measure of the effect of each player’s obstruction.
8This implies 2-connectedness because a network with a finite diameter is connected.
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Definition 8. A node is obstructive if and only if his obstruction means that
two or more nodes who could previously communicate no longer can. That is,
player k is obstructive iff ∃ i, j ∈ N such that wij(Ω) > 0 and pij(k,Ω) = 0.
Obstruction is linked to social distance, because player k is not obstructive
if for all {i, j} with dij(G) ≤ T we also have that dij(G−k) ≤ T . That is to
say, player k is not obstructive if he does not increase the social distances too
much by his absence from the information network. We collect the conditions
for obstructiveness in the following Remark, highlighting the link between
obstructiveness and the length of the cycles that include a player.
Remark 1.4.2. If k has only one neighbour, k is not obstructive. If k has more
than one neighbour, then k is not obstructive if and only if the following. For
each pair of nodes l,m with dlm(G) ≤ T and for whom the sequence (i, k, j) is
part of the shortest path(s) between them (implying that i, j ∈ Nk), we require
that dlm(G) − 2 + dij(G−k) ≤ T , or equivalently that there exists a cycle in G
including the sequence (i, k, j) with length ≤ T + 4− dlm(G).
More generally, if a player k has more than one neighbour, a sufficient
condition for him not to be obstructive is if, for each pair of k’s neighbours
i, j ∈ Nk, there is a cycle of length ≤ 4 including the sequence (i, k, j). This
implies that for all l,m ∈ N who have the sequence (i, k, j) as part of the shortest
path(s) between them, we have that dlm(G−k) = dlm(G).
Figure 1.5 shows an example of this result. In both networks in the Figure,
G is made up of all the solid and dashed links, while G−k includes only the
solid links. In the network on the left, k is in a cycle of four in network G,
and dlm(G) = 4. If node k is removed, and we examine G−k, then the social
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Figure 1.5: Examples of obstructiveness
distance between l and m is unchanged — it remains 4. This is because there
is an alternative route between l and m via node o. Node o is connected to
k’s neighbours i and j, so any other walks in a wider network which include
the sequence {i, k, j} could instead include the sequence {i, o, j}, which is the
same length. So if k is in a cycle of length 4, his removal from the network does
not increase the social distances of any other pairs of nodes. So k cannot be
obstructive, no matter what the value of T is. On the other hand, the network
on the right shows a case where k could be obstructive, depending on the value
of T. Now in G−k, the social distance between l and m has increased to 5 links,
whereas before when k was present it was only 4. So if T = 4, with k passing on
signals in the network it would be possible for l and m to communicate. Without
him, they cannot: k is obstructive.
The length of the cycle determines whether or not k’s neighbours can still
communicate, even when k is obstructing those signals. The importance of cycles
of length four, our sufficient condition for a player not to be obstructive, recalls
well-known results on the importance of network cycles of length three: Coleman’s
(1988) closure; and Jackson et al.’s (2012) support.
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In Remark 1.2.1 we said that a network is informative if everyone
can communicate without obstruction. Now we can make a link between
obstructiveness and visibility.
Proposition 2. Player k is visible if and only if the network is informative and
player k is not obstructive.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that there are two possible reasons why a player may
not be visible: firstly, if the network is not informative, so that even without
obstruction some nodes cannot communicate; and secondly, if the network is
informative but a player is obstructive, in that he can prevent some nodes from
communicating if he does not pass signals. Obstructiveness sheds further light
on the star network.
Remark 1.4.3. For a given number of nodes in a connected information network




It is useful to rank nodes by their capacity to send or receive signals in the
network. We do so by constructing a centrality measure from the probabilities of
information transmission, which we call word-of-mouth centrality.
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Definition 9. Word-of-mouth centrality is the average probability of








We have assumed an unweighted, undirected network so that ingoing and
outgoing measures are symmetric, but alternatives are easily computed. Let
W (Ω) = 1
n
∑
i∈N wi(Ω) be the average word-of-mouth centrality in a network.
There are several related measures of centrality, in particular diffusion
centrality and communication centrality (Banerjee et al., 2013, 2014), Bonacich
centrality (Bonacich, 1987), information centrality (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989),
random walk closeness centrality (Noh and Rieger, 2004), cascade centrality
(Teytelboym et al., 2015), and percolation centrality (Moore and Newman, 2000;
Piraveenan et al., 2013) in the epidemiological literature. As far as we are aware,
no measure uses probabilities of information travelling by diffusion between two
nodes.
1.5.1 Comparison with diffusion centrality
Of particular interest is the relationship between our measure and diffusion
centrality. Banerjee et al. (2013) empirically investigate the effects of information
in social networks on the decisions of individuals to take up a microfinance
opportunity in villages in India. They develop diffusion centrality as an
approximation of communication centrality, a simulated measure linked to the
Susceptible, Infected, Recovered model (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Bailey,
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1957), which runs for a finite period of time and allows for non-participants to pass
on the message. Diffusion centrality has a 0.86 correlation with communication






, and p is equal to the inverse
of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, λmax(G). This is because as
T tends to infinity, diffusion centrality becomes proportional to either Bonacich
centrality or eigenvector centrality, depending on whether p is smaller or larger
than 1/λmax(G), respectively. Thus they choose this critical value of 1/λmax(G)
for their p, since “the entries of pGT tend to 0 as T grows if p < 1/λmax(G),
and some entries diverge if p > 1/λmax(G)”. But diffusion centrality does
not take account of double counting, measuring instead the total amount of
information travelling between nodes in a network — rather than the probability
that information flows. This means that it overemphasises the benefit of hearing
a lot of information, because at some point extra information is redundant if these
signals are likely to have already been received via other walks in the network.
Figure 1.6 compares diffusion centrality and word-of-mouth centrality, using
data from one of the Indian villages studied by Banerjee et al. (2013). Centralities
are calculated at the household level.9 The value of p = 1/λmax(G) is used
to compare the two centralities in the left chart, and there is clearly a strong
relationship between the two measures. In fact, at this value of p, a linear
transformation of diffusion centrality would be a good approximation of the node-
to-node probabilities, and this approach is used by Breza and Chandrasekhar
(2015). The chart suggests a transformation factor of 0.06.
The chart on the right shows the comparison between the two measures when




j∈N wij (i.e. not excluding
wii compared to the formula in Definition 9). This makes it more comparable with diffusion
centrality, which includes the diagonal entries of the matrix in its sum.
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Figure 1.6: Comparing centrality measures in a village
we use a larger p, and while ranking seems to be generally preserved, there
is some divergence in the relative magnitude of the measures, as the word-of-
mouth centralities converge towards 1. So if there is any reason to suspect that
p differs from 1/λmax(G), word-of-mouth centrality may be useful for calculating
probabilities of information transmission by diffusion in a network. In particular,
we can observe that the level of inequality in diffusion centrality between the
nodes in a network is higher than when word-of-mouth centrality is used. This is
because central nodes who receive a lot of information have extremely high values
of diffusion centrality. But with word-of-mouth centrality, the effect of this extra
information is discounted due to the fact that it is probably redundant. Central
nodes have most likely received the signal via other walks already. This analysis
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suggests that diffusion centrality overemphasises the benefit of a central network
position in relation to information transmission.
1.5.2 Obstruction and centrality
We can also calculate centrality measures that take account of obstruction.
Definition 10. Obstructed centrality Pi(Ω) is the average probability a
signal emitted by a player will be received by others, averaged over the possible









A player’s obstructed centrality could be significantly lower than their word-of-
mouth centrality if the network architecture means it is easy for other nodes to
obstruct their signals.10 Next we examine the effect that a node’s obstruction
can have on the communication of other nodes, in a similar vein to betweenness
centrality (Freeman, 1977).
Definition 11. A node’s obstructing centrality Ok(Ω) is the average
probability other players can communicate if that node obstructs the signals.
10Note that, like diffusion and word-of-mouth centrality, this measure varies with the
primitives of information transmission p and T , because these parameters weight the importance
of walks of different lengths for information transmission in the network. To abstract from this,
we could examine a measure which focuses only on the structure of the network links in G by
using p = 1 and T = DG, the diameter of the network. But this would be less interesting
because it would not weigh the paths by their length nor whether there is double counting of
paths — it would just be a measure of the size of the connected components in the network
when each node is removed.
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Node Bi di wi Pi Ok bi
1,8 1.6663 0.6485 0.0735 0.0573 0.1217 0
2,7 2.2211 1.1871 0.1281 0.1024 0.0991 12
3,6 2.4040 1.3589 0.1486 0.1168 0.0896 20
4,5 2.4588 1.4073 0.1550 0.1206 0.0866 24
Average 2.1876 1.1505 0.1443 0.0993 0.0993 14.0
(a) Line network
Node Bi di wi Pi Ok bi
1 8.3784 5.5334 0.4870 0.3907 0 42
2-8 3.5135 1.8850 0.2157 0.1512 0.2070 0
Average 4.1216 2.3411 0.2853 0.1811 0.1811 5.25
(b) Star network
Table 1.1: Comparison of centrality measures for two networks of eight nodes









Table 1.1 shows the different centrality measures for the line and the star
example networks in Figure 1.2. For each node we compare Bonacich centrality
Bi, diffusion centrality di, betweenness centrality bi, word-of-mouth centrality wi,
obstructed centrality Pi and obstructing centrality Ok. On almost all measures,
centrality increases towards the centre of the line, and the periphery nodes in the
star are always less central than the centre. Meanwhile obstructing centrality is
higher at the end of the line and the periphery of the star, showing that if those
players obstruct signals, the probability of information transmission between the
other players is closer to wi. Obstructing centrality for the centre of the star is
zero, because if he obstructs signals, no-one else in the network can communicate.
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1.6 Applications
These probabilities of information transmission could be used in many types of
games on networks. They are particularly relevant for games of imperfect private
monitoring, where nodes do not necessarily receive the same signals about past
play (Kandori, 2002; Sekiguchi, 1997; Bhaskar and Obara, 2002; Chen, 2010). In
Chapter 2 we study the case of cooperation in networks where the information
on past transgressions flows through the network by word-of-mouth. We find two
different aspects of trust that each relate to obstructed and obstructing centrality
measures.
As described above, diffusion centrality was developed by Banerjee et al.
(2013) as an approximation of communication centrality, which shows how overall
participation in a microfinance scheme depends on the centrality of the injection
points of information about it. As we have shown, the problem of double counting
with diffusion centrality is exacerbated if the parameter p varies significantly
from the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. It would
be interesting to see how well word-of-mouth centrality, which takes account of
double counting, would fare as an approximation of communication centrality.
As well as Banerjee et al. (2013), two other recent empirical papers have
used diffusion centrality as an approximation of the probability of information
transmission. Breza and Chandrasekhar (2015) use it to investigate how
monitoring by different members of a community in villages in India incentivises
individuals to save for the future. They find that a savings monitor with
higher diffusion centrality in the village network significantly increases savings.
Fafchamps and Labonne (2016) use family network data from the Philippines
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to test whether households’ centrality affects whether they receive services
from the municipal government. They find that betweenness centrality is
more important than their measure of information diffusion, highlighting the
importance of coalition-building in politics. In both these cases, double counting
the transmission of signals may be an issue, and so it would be interesting
to compare these results to those using the word-of-mouth probabilities. In
addition, the role of obstruction could be important. For example, obstructing
centrality might be relevant for the analysis in Fafchamps and Labonne (2016),
since it depends on the number of walks between other nodes that a node
occupies (similar to betweenness centrality), but also measures the importance
of those walks for communication between other nodes. Meanwhile in Breza and
Chandrasekhar (2015)’s context, obstruction might be important because people
who had not fulfilled their commitments to increased saving may not wish to pass
on information about this failure.
1.7 Conclusion
We have shown a new way to calculate the probabilities of node-to-node
information transmission in networks. This simple measure can be used to allow
Bayesian updating in network games where signals, rather than posterior beliefs or
actions, are transmitted through the network. We also allowed for the case where
nodes may conceal information travelling through the network. This approach
gives us several new centrality measures, which tell us the average probabilities





1.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Obstructed word-of-mouth probabilities and the information structure Ω.
1. Increasing p: We have that
∂wij(p,T,G)
∂p
≥ 0 with a strict inequality if and
only if lij(τ,G) > 0 for any τ ≤ T , that is, if and only if i and j are
connected by one or more walks of length ≤ T in the network G.
2. Increasing T to T + 1: Let
Fij(p, T,G) = 1− wij(Ω) =
T∏
τ=1
[1− pτ ]lij(τ,G) (1.A.1)
If T increases to T + 1, we have that
Fij(p, T + 1,G) = Fij(p, T,G)(1− p(T+1))lij(T+1,G) (1.A.2)
So Fij(p, T + 1,G) < Fij(p, T,G) if and only if lij(T + 1,G) ≥ 1; otherwise
they are equal. The same argument holds for any further increases in T .
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Hence Fij(Ω) is weakly monotonically decreasing in T and so wij(Ω) is
weakly monotonically increasing in T .
3. Adding a link to the information network: Suppose that we add a
link to the network G, creating the network G′, which has an additional
walk of length τ between i and j so that lij(τ,G
′) = lij(τ,G) + 1. Now we
want to compare Fij(p, T,G
′) and Fij(p, T,G). Since
Fij(p, T,G
′) = Fij(p, T,G)(1− pτ ) (1.A.3)
We have that Fij(p, T,G
′) < Fij(p, T,G) as required. Meanwhile any
change to the network that leaves lij(τ) unchanged ∀τ ≤ T leaves the
probabilities unchanged.
1.A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
From (1.A.2) we have that Fij(Ω) is decreasing in T since (1−p(T+1))lij(T+1,G−k) <
1. Observe also that Fij(Ω) is bounded from below by 0. This means that
Fij(Ω) converges to a lower bound. This lower bound is strictly positive,
limT→∞ Fij(Ω) = F ∗ij (Ω) > 0, because p > 0 and at the limit, the factor
by which Fij(Ω) decreases is limT→∞(1 − p(T+1))lij(T+1,G−k) = 1. As wij(Ω) is
the complement of Fij(Ω), this implies that wij(Ω) converges to an upper bound
P∗ij < 1.
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1.A.3 Proof of Remark 1.3.1
For any r, the total number of walks of even length is (ab)r (since each walk is
counted twice — incoming and outgoing — in (1.3.10)). The total number of
walks of even length is 1
2
(ab)r(a + b), and so the total number of walks of any
length for each r is 1
2
(ab)r(2 + a + b). If group sizes are equal then a = b = n
2
(assuming n is even), while with the star we have that a = 1 and b = n − 1.
Comparing the number of walks in these two cases, we find that the number of
walks is strictly higher with two equal groups if n2 − 4n + 4 > 0, which is the
case for n > 2.
1.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
By Remark 1.4.1, the network is informative if and only if G is connected and
DG ≤ T , and player k is visible if and only if G−k is connected and DG−k ≤ T .
Since removing a node from the network cannot connect a disconnected network,
and can only increase social distances so that dij(G−k) ≥ dij(G) ∀ i, j, k ∈ N , if
G−k is connected and DG−k ≤ T , this implies that G is connected and DG ≤ T :
i.e. a player’s visibility implies the original network G is informative. When the
network is informative, wij(G) > 0 ∀ i, j ∈ N , and so k is visible if and only if
he is not obstructive.
1.A.5 Proof of Remark 1.4.3
There are n!
2(n−2)! pairs in a network of n nodes, and if L is the number of visible
nodes, there are L!
2(L−2)! pairs where both partners are visible. In an informative
tree network, all nodes except the leaf nodes are obstructive, because leaf nodes
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are the only ones who would not disconnect the network by their absence. Nodes
are defined as visible if they are not obstructive in an informative network, so
only the leaf nodes in a tree network are visible. All nodes except the centre of
the star are leaf nodes, and so the star has the maximum number of visible nodes
for any tree: L = n− 1.
1.B Obstruction by subsets of nodes in different
rounds of information transmission
Let Xτ be the subset of nodes who obstruct a signal in round τ of information
transmission. Let X = {Xτ ⊂ N , 1 ≤ τ ≤ T} be the set of those subsets. Let
lij(τ,G,X) be the number of walks between i and j of length τ when the set of
obstructing nodes is X.
To calculate this, recall that nodes only remember the information they receive
in the last round. So longer walks will not connect to other nodes, if the links it
would traverse are those which connect a node who is obstructing in the relevant
round of information transmission. So we have that, for example, lij(1,G,X) =
[G−X1 ]ij where G−X1 is the network G with those nodes in X1 removed. Then
we have that lij(2,G,X) = [G−X2G−X1 ]ij and lij(3,G,X) = [G−X3G−X2G−X1 ]ij,
and so on. In general, lij(τ,G,X) = [
∏τ
τ=1 G−Xτ ]ij, ensuring that the ordering





2. Cooperation in networks
2.1 Introduction
The extent to which individuals can trust and cooperate with each other in the
absence of formal enforcement has important effects on economic outcomes and
has long been a topic of scholarly interest.11 Trust consists of “placing valued
outcomes at risk of others’ malfeasance”(Tilly, 2004) and empirical research on
the topic often begins with the survey question: “generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people?” But where does this trust come from? In economic models, there
are two main reasons why one person might trust another, even in the face of
temptation. Firstly, because their partner could face punishment for behaving
badly, shifting their incentives away from shirking. In this case, if a player knows
the expected punishment facing their partner, they can decide whether to trust
them on not depending on whether they think the punishment is strong enough
to incentivise good behaviour. Secondly, their partner’s type could determine
their action: they may be a good type who is immune to temptation — or a bad
type who will always cheat no matter what. In this case, if a player knows his
partner’s type, then he knows whether to trust him or not.
In this chapter we build a model which examines both drivers of trust -
incentives and types - and show how each aspect depends on the structure of
a communication network which connects players. These links could depend on
many factors: family and kin relationships; friendships or trading relationships;
or proximity given by physical geography such as roads, rivers or the streets of
11Coleman (1988); Ostrom (1990); Fukuyama (1996); Putnam et al. (1994); Knack and Keefer
(1997); Leeson (2005).
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a town. We use a two-sided trust model that allows players to cooperate in a
prisoner’s dilemma game if and only if they both trust each other. Cooperation
is supported by community enforcement: the threat of punishment by other
members of the group for any deviation that is detected.12
This gives us our main result: a ‘cooperation network’ showing who within a
community can cooperate with whom, which is endogenous to the communication
network and the other parameters of the model. This network of cooperation
may be quite different from the original communication network, and shows how
certain network structures can be more or less supportive of overall levels of
cooperation, and hence lead to higher (or lower) payoffs.
We find that a pair of players can cooperate if and only if they can both trust
each other not to deviate. In particular, a player is trusted to cooperate if his
position in the network means that other players are able to communicate about
him. When trust depends on incentives, what matters is players’ expectations
of the likelihood of detection and hence punishment. This in turn is linked to
obstructing centrality given in Chapter 1: the average probability that other
players can communicate about someone, if he tries to obstruct the message.
We also identify a second aspect of trust: a player is trusting if his network
position means he is likely to detect deviations by others. When trust depends
on knowledge of players’ types, payoffs are linked to obstructed centrality, which
gives the average probability that a player will receive messages that have been
obstructed by others. Players who have better knowledge of past play because of
12Community enforcement can support cooperation in many settings (Greif, 1993), and its
reliance on information transmission between players has been highlighted by Kandori (1992):
“In small communities where members can observe each other’s behaviour [...] the
crux of the matter is information transmission among the community members.”
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their central network position can be more trusting.
We find that both aspects of trust increase with greater probabilities of
information transmission, expanding the number of players who can cooperate,
and leading to (weakly) higher welfare as information flow increases. These two
centrality measures, and hence the two aspects of trust, do not necessarily move
together, leading to some surprising results in certain networks. For example, we
might expect the centre of a star to be very trusted, because everyone can observe
him. Not so. In fact we find that for most parameters in a star network, players
on the periphery can cooperate with each other, but the centre is excluded from
cooperation. This is because if the centre deviates, the periphery players cannot
inform each other, because they are completely dependent upon him for their
communication (his obstructing centrality is zero, as shown in Chapter 1). Hence
they cannot trust him not to deviate. We also find cases where the two aspects
of trust are diametrically opposed to each other. In a line network, players in
the centre of the line cannot be trusted because those at the two ends of the line
cannot communicate with each other about the centre’s bad behaviour. On the
other hand, these central players are very trusting because their network position
means they are highly likely to receive signals about others’ deviations. In fact, in
the line network, those players who are neither in the centre nor the end have the
highest capacity to cooperate, echoing the concept of middle-status conformity
(Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001).13
13I am grateful to Birger Wernerfelt for providing this reference.
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2.1.1 Related literature
The important effect of networks in shaping and influencing economic outcomes
has long been emphasised, most recently by Jackson (2008) and Goyal (2007).
In particular, there is now a growing literature examining repeated games where
interactions and/or monitoring are influenced by a network connecting players,
surveyed comprehensively by Nava (2016).14
Dixit (2003b) looks at community enforcement when community members are
distant from each other. He allows distance to affect three things: the probability
players meet, the payoffs if they do, and also the probability they can exchange
information. In his model, a continuum of players are arranged around a circle,
and cooperation between pairs of players, who are matched in the first period of a
two-period game, can be supported by punishment in the final period. A player’s
incentive to deviate depends on the probability that a true signal emitted by
the victim of his deviation will be received by other players: his potential future
partners. Dixit finds the ‘size of the trading world’, an arc of his circle which
shows the greatest distance possible between cooperating players, and beyond
which they shirk – a similar concept to Fukuyama’s (2001) ‘radius of trust’. Dixit
finds that honesty prevails in a small enough world, and self-enforcing honesty
decreases as size increases. He also compares community enforcement to global
enforcement with different-sized worlds.
In this chapter, we modify Dixit’s continuous model of community
14Nava and Piccione (2014) examine the case of local public goods, where a player takes
the same action with respect to each of his neighbours, while Wolitzky (2013) finds a new
centrality measure that can influence a player’s robust maximum contribution to global public
goods. Karlan et al. (2009), Breza and Chandrasekhar (2015) and Annen (2003) investigate
the role of network links in supporting commitment in different settings.
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enforcement to apply in a network setting with discrete players. To do so to
specify the process by which information is transmitted within the network,
using the probabilities of node-to-node information transmission we developed
in Chapter 1. These word-of-mouth probabilities are based on diffusion (Banerjee
et al., 2013, 2014), where information flows through a limited number of links,
each link with a decay factor that represents the probability that two neighbouring
players in the information network pass a signal between them. The signal that
flows through our network is a player’s ‘bad reputation’, which Kandori (1992)
shows is adequate to ensure that a deviator will be punished by other members
of the community. To make our diffusion model more tractable, and following
Dixit (2003b), we make arguably rather strong assumptions about truth-telling,
abstracting from interesting issues around the possibilities of cheap talk and
fabricating rumours, which are studied in detail elsewhere (Ahn and Suominen,
2001; Bloch et al., 2014; Annen, 2011).
There are many possible ways information can flow in networks (Borgatti,
2005) and many sophisticated information structures have been proposed in this
field, and we believe ours is the first model to use probabilistic information flow.
Balmaceda and Escobar (2013) and Raub and Weesie (1990) model information as
flowing along one link in the network. Renault and Tomala (1998) and Wolitzky
(2014) let information flow through all links in a connected component, finding
that the potential for cooperation depends on whether the network is 2-connected.
Lippert and Spagnolo (2011) allow information to travel through network links
with a delay and highlight the importance of gatekeeping for cooperation, while
in an alternative model with delay Kinateder (2008) finds the diameter of the
network plays an important role. Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008), Laclau (2014)
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and Larson (2014, 2017) allow messages to be passed to a subset of players, while
in a different setting, Gallo (2014) models information flow in a network as a
random walk process.
The communication network in our model means that different players may
have different beliefs about past play, depending on the signals they receive from
each other through the network, and so our repeated game falls within the class of
games of imperfect private monitoring (Kandori, 2002; Sekiguchi, 1997; Bhaskar
and Obara, 2002; Chen, 2010). Like Dixit (2003b), our solution concept is perfect
Bayesian equilibrium because our players use Bayesian updating when they
receive signals through the network. As described in Chapter 1, our probabilistic
information flow of signals (not beliefs) allows for Bayesian updating in networks,
in contrast to behavioural approaches often used in networks (Degroot, 1974;
Golub and Jackson, 2012).
In common with much of the literature on cooperation, we model pairwise
interactions between players where the stage game is the prisoners’ dilemma, as
do Lippert and Spagnolo (2011), Ali and Miller (2013), Bloch, Genicot and Ray
(2008) and Laclau (2012). In those papers, a network of relationships determines
both the interaction possibilities and the information flows between players. In
contrast, we allow interactions and monitoring relationships to be unrelated to
each other - players can play the stage game with partners with whom they do
not exchange information and vice versa, as is the case for Fainmesser (2012) and
Fainmesser and Goldberg (2012), although, different to them, our networks are
common knowledge. This allows us to highlight the importance of two distinct
aspects of enforcement: monitoring via the information network; and sanctioning
via the matching probabilities (Ostrom, 1990; Sobel, 2002). Like Kandori (1992)
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and Ellison (1994), each pair of players in our model has a given probability of
matching, and this is independent across periods.
There are two key cooperation-supporting punishment strategies seen most
frequently in the literature: contagion, used by Kandori (1992), Ali and Miller
(2013) and Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan (2012); and grim trigger or
ostracism (sometimes with forgiveness) used by Ahn and Suominen (2001), Raub
and Weesie (1990) and Ali and Miller (2016). In common with Dixit (2003b),
we apply a different approach: an incomplete information game where players
behave cooperatively in order to avoid being mistaken for a bad type whom future
partners would ostracise. This means that the punishment is renegotiation-proof
(Farrell and Maskin, 1989; Benoit and Krishna, 1993; Jackson et al., 2012), and
in our setting entails a finitely repeated game (Benoit and Krishna, 1985), in
contrast to much of the literature where infinite repetition is used. The bad type
also means that this is a game of reputation (Samuelson and Mailath, 2006) and
also allows us to pin down expectations off the equilibrium path.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the network
connecting players and the repeated game, and Section 2.3 describes the
equilibrium of interest. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 show how levels of trust, cooperation
and payoffs depend on the structure of the network. Section 2.6 concludes the
chapter.
61
2. Cooperation in networks
2.2 The network and the cooperation game
In this section, we begin the outline of our model by showing how information
flows in the network, and how matching probabilities and payoffs can also
depend on the network. The N players occupy the nodes of a fixed undirected
unweighted network g such that {i, j} ∈ g if i and j are neighbours. A walk
of length a between two nodes i and j in network g is a sequence of nodes
(i = x0, x1, ..., xa−1, xa = j) such that for every r ∈ {1, 2, ..., a}, we have that
{xr−1, xr} ∈ g. If the nodes are distinct, the sequence is a path, and if in addition
i = j, it is a cycle. Let G = [gij] be the adjacency matrix of the network g,
where gij = 1 indicates that players i and j are neighbours so {i, j} ∈ g, and
gij = 0 otherwise (and gii = 0 ∀i ∈ N by convention). The network G is common
knowledge; all players know each other’s network positions. Let Ni = {j : gij = 1}
be the set of player i’s neighbours and |Ni| be i’s degree.
As usual, dij(G) is the length of the shortest path between two players i and j
in the network G, which is known as the social distance. Let DG = max{dij(G)}
be the diameter of the network G: the length of the longest shortest path. Two
players are connected if there exists a path of finite length between them, and
a network is connected if all players are connected to each other. If G is not
connected, its diameter is infinite. Let G−k be the adjacency matrix of the
network with player k removed - that is, the n × n adjacency matrix created
when all the entries in the kth row and column of G are set to zero. If G−k
is connected then the network is 2-connected with respect to k; the network is
2-connected if it is 2-connected with respect to all players.
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2.2.1 Information transmission
In this chapter we make use of the obstructed probabilities of information diffusion
that were developed in Chapter 1, based on the process of obstructed diffusion
given in Definition 5. With obstructed diffusion, a signal flows through each link
in the network with a fixed probability p, up to a maximum number of links
T . The parameter p denotes how likely players are to meet and/or exchange
information with their neighbours. For example, if p = 1 and T = 1, information
is passed with certainty only to a player’s direct neighbours. When information
is transmitted by obstructed diffusion, players can choose whether or not to pass
on signals they receive, but cannot fabricate them. Passing information on or
concealing it are both costless.
2.2.2 Matching probabilities
The repeated game of cooperation has three periods: t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In periods 1
and 3, players are matched in pairs and the stage game is played. In period 2,
information is transmitted in the network. There are n players in N = {1, ..., n}
where n > 2 and even. Let µti denote player i’s partner in periods t ∈ {1, 3}, and
µt list the partnerships in each period, with µ = (µ1, µ3). Matching probabilities,
mij ∀i, j ∈ N , determine the likelihood that any two players are matched as
partners, and these are independent across periods: 15
Pr{µti = j} = mij = mji = Pr{µtj = i} ∀t ∈ {1, 3} (2.2.1)
15This is for simplicity; matching probabilities do not need to be constant across both periods
for our results to go through.
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Let mij > 0 ∀ j 6= i, so that there is a positive possibility of meeting any
player. Also let mii ≥ 0, which, if positive, signifies that a player is ‘sitting out’
of the stage game without a partner; that is, we do not require perfect matching
where everyone has a partner. Players know the identity of their own partner,
but not who anyone else has matched with, as in Kandori (1992). The matching
probabilities are collected in the symmetric doubly stochastic matrix M = [mij].
Our baseline model allows for any matching probabilities, but it may often be
the case that local matching would apply, where matching probabilities depend on
the network. In particular, local matching could mean that probabilities decrease
with social distance, and that there is a parameter, Tm, which gives the maximum
social distance over which players have a non-negligible probability of matching.
We consider this case in an example network in Section 2.4 and Appendix 2.D.
2.2.3 The stage game
The stage game is the prisoners’ dilemma with exit (Benoit and Krishna, 1985),
augmented by an additional ‘dangerous’ action Bi, which is very damaging for a
player’s partner: e.g. ‘steal everything’. The action space for each player i ∈ N
is Ai = {Ci, Di, Oi, Bi} where Ci is cooperation and Di is defection, Oi is exit
and Bi is the dangerous action. Table 2.1 shows how payoffs depend on actions.
2.2.3.1 Player types
There are two types of player in the set Ξ = {S-type, B-type}. Most of the
players are strategic or ‘S-type’; but there are a few bad apples — ‘B-types’
— who lurk in the population. This is a game of incomplete information as
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Cµti Dµti Oµti Bµti
Ci 1 −β 0 −β
Di α σ 0 −β
Oi 0 0 0 0
Bi xi xi xi/2 xi
Table 2.1: The stage game between player i and his partner µti. Payoffs are
symmetric, and the entries denote the payoffs of the row player.
players do not observe each other’s types — as well as imperfect monitoring
as described earlier. The bad type is included in the game in order to make
punishment renegotiation-proof (Samuelson and Mailath, 2006), and to pin down
expectations off the equilibrium path. These bad or ‘inept’ types are sometimes
called commitment types because they are committed to a certain action. In our
case, we use a simple specification for the payoffs of the bad type.
We assume that xi = −x for S-types and xi = x for B-types, and that
x > β > α > 1 > σ > 0 and 2 > α − β. This implies that the dangerous action
Bi is strictly dominant for a B-type and strictly dominated for the S-type. In turn,
these assumptions mean that the stage game between two S-types is the usual
prisoners’ dilemma with exit, which has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies:
mutual defection (Di, Dµti) or mutual exit (Oi, Oµti). For a game between an
S-type player i and a B-type, the only Nash equilibrium is (Oi, Bµti).
We make the following assumption about φ, an S-type player’s prior belief
that another player is a B-type.
Assumption 1 σ(1− φ)− βφ > 0
This assumption ensures that an S-type player will not exit against an unknown
player he expects to defect, in either period when the stage game is played.
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2.2.3.2 Payoffs and the network
We also assume that the payoffs in Table 2.1 are multiplied by the factor
γiµti > 0 to give the overall payoffs for player i facing µ
t
i 6= i, his match in
period t.16 These factors signify the possibility of higher or lower payoffs when
facing different partners, and are collected in the matrix Γ = [γij]. As Dixit
(2003b) describes, different levels of payoffs with different partners could reflect,
for example, complementarities in production with players who have different
skills or resources. These complementarities could be greater with players who
are at greater social distance, and we examine this case in Section 2.4.
A player’s payoff in each period depends only on his own action, that of
his partner, and on the identity of his match. Let ati ∈ Ai and Ui(ati, atµti , γiµti)
respectively be i’s action and payoff in the stage game in period t ∈ {1, 3}, and
let at list the actions in period t.
2.2.4 Reputation and community enforcement
A player k gets a bad reputation (Kandori, 1992), rk = 1, if and only if their
partner in period 1 received a negative payoff.
rk = 1 ⇐⇒ U1µ1k < 0 (2.2.2)
Otherwise, they have rk = 0. So a B-type player will always get a bad reputation
(as long as he did not ‘sit out’ with no partner), as will an S-type player who
16If µti = i, a player ‘sits out’ of the stage game with no partner, payoffs are zero and γii = 0.
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defected against a cooperating partner.
Pr[rk = 1 | {k is B-type}, µ1k 6= k] = 1 (2.2.3)
Pr[rk = 1 | {k is S-type}, µ1k 6= k, Dk, Cµ1k ∈ a
1] = 1 (2.2.4)
In contrast to some reputation models, in our case a player’s reputation is not
publicly available — only some players hear about it. Let si(k) ∈ {{1}, 6©} be
the signal that player i sends about player k, where si(k) = 1 signifies k’s bad
reputation.17 We assume that a player emits a signal about another player if and
only if that player has a bad reputation and was his period 1 partner. That is,
only the true victim of a deviation will emit a signal. This assumption requires
a certain degree of truth-telling because we assume that players do not initiate
false bad reputations about other players.
Assumption 2 si(k) = 1 ⇐⇒ rk = 1 and µ1k = i ∀i, k ∈ N
After the signal is emitted, it may be received by other players: let ρj(k) ∈
{{1}, 6©} be the signal that j receives about k. The probability pij(k) that a
signal emitted by i about k will reach j is as follows.
Pr [ρj(k) = 1 | si(k)] =

pij(k) if si(k) = 1
0 if si(k) = 6©
∀i, j, k ∈ N (2.2.5)
Due to Assumption 2, note that pij(k) = 0 if k ∈ {i, j}, because a player cannot
17Samuelson and Mailath (2006) show how this separating equilibrium with a bad type is one
alternative for reputational games; the other is a pooling equilibrium with a ‘good type’. See
Appendix 2.A for this alternative in our model. Spence (1973) and Breza and Chandrasekhar
(2015) use a specification of the reputation model where both good and bad signals are emitted.
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emit a signal about himself — only his victim can.
2.2.5 The repeated game
Players are risk-neutral von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximisers,
with expected utility function vi(·). Given players’ common discount factor
δ ∈]0, 1], payoffs in the repeated game with strategy profile b and realised matches
µ are given by










, γiµ3i ) (2.2.6)




i ) be player i’s pure strategy in the repeated game where
bi ∈ Bi = {{a1i , a3i } | a1i : µ1i → Ai, a3i : {µ3i , h3i } → Ai}. Let the pure strategy
space be B =
∏
i∈N Bi and b = (bi)i∈N be a pure strategy profile of the repeated
game.
Let ρj = (ρj(k))k∈N be player j’s ‘network signal’. Player i’s history





i , ρi) at
the beginning of period 3. That is, he knows his own and his period 1 partner’s
reputations, and could also receive a network signal about any other player. But
he has not observed his period 1 match’s type, only their reputation. The repeated
game is defined as the tuple:
F ≡ (N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ,Ξ, φ,M,Γ, [pij(k)]i,j,k∈N)
2.2.6 Timing of the game
In summary, the order of the game is as follows:
68
2. Cooperation in networks
Period 1
• Players are randomly matched for period 1: µ1 is chosen
• Players choose actions a1 and receive payoffs
• Players’ reputations are updated, given their partner’s payoffs. Each player
i observes his own and his partner’s reputations ri, rµ
1
i with certainty
• For any player i with ri = 1, a signal is emitted by his partner, sµ1i (i) = 1
Period 2
• Information travels between players according to the probabilities
[pij(k)]i,j,k∈N
period 3
• Players observe a network signal ρi
• Players are randomly matched for period 3: µ3 is chosen
• Players choose actions a3 and receive payoffs
2.3 Equilibrium
We would like to construct an equilibrium with cooperation; in particular, where
cooperation in period 1 can be supported by community enforcement in period 3.
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We construct this equilibrium as follows.18 In period 1, players either cooperate
against a cooperating partner or defect against a defecting partner. In period 3,
almost all players defect. Those who do not defect choose exit, which happens if
and only if they know that their period 3 partner deviated from the equilibrium
strategy in period 1. So if a player deviates by defecting against a cooperating
partner in period 1, he knows that any player he is matched with in period 3 —
if they find out about his deviation — will choose exit against him, not defection.
According to Table 2.1, mutual defection gives a strictly positive payoff and exit
gives a zero payoff to both players, so a player could lose out on positive period 3
payoffs if he deviates in period 1. This expected loss — this punishment — can
sustain cooperation.
At this equilibrium, actions may not be symmetric — in period 1 some players
may be cooperating while others may not — but all players use the same decision
rule for their action choice, a rule that is based on the expected probability of
punishment. We are particularly interested in how many players cooperate at
this equilibrium, and which ones they are with respect to their network position.
Proposition 3. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the repeated game F for all
S-type players i ∈ N is given by the following equilibrium strategy:
Period 1 Player i cooperates with his partner j if and only if his expected losses
from deviation are above a threshold value, that is Lji ≥ L∗ij, and also that an
equivalent threshold value is met for his partner so that Lij ≥ L∗ji. Otherwise,
18We expect there to be many equilibria of this game; we do not attempt to characterise
them here. Like Dixit (2003b), we focus only on our equilibrium of interest. For example, there
is also an equilibrium where no information is passed, since players are indifferent to passing
information in the final round of information transmission, and so an equilibrium strategy
including information transmission is only weakly preferred.
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he defects.
Period 2 Player i passes on signals about other players k 6= i, but does not pass
on signals about himself.
Period 3 Player i exits against his partner k if and only if he believes that he
is a B-type: either having heard a signal about him or having matched with
him in the previous period. Otherwise, he defects.
Proof. See Propositions 4,5 and 6, and Remark 2.3.1.
If there were no B-types, this equilibrium would be subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (Benoit and Krishna, 1985). The existence of the B-types implies that
the punishment is renegotiation-proof (Benoit and Krishna, 1993) and allows us
to pin down expectations off of the equilibrium path.19 The equilibrium concept
is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, because players update their beliefs about their
partner’s type according to the signal(s) they receive and Bayes’ rule.
To construct this equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction and examine
only the payoffs and decisions of the S-type players. To simplify the notation in
this section, let player i’s partner in period 1 be player j = µ1i , and his partner
in period 3 be player k = µ3i .
19This is because in equilibrium, B-types will deviate and any players who hear about it will
update their beliefs on those players’ types. Without the B-types, players would not expect
anyone to deviate. In this case, if they do hear about a deviation, their beliefs are not clearly
specified. The B-types also mean that punishment is renegotiation-proof because the preferred
action against a B-type player is always exit. If players face instead a known S-type who they
are supposed to punish with an exit action, it would be in both players’ interests to forgo
punishment and mutually defect.
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2.3.1 Period 3
In period 3 each player knows his own reputation and that of his period 1
partner, ri and rj; and his network signal ρi, but he does not know who anyone
else matched with or what transpired in those matches. There are two general
possibilities for player i’s history in period 3. If he met another S-type in period
1, he has history (ri = 0, rj = 0) since neither of them deviated. Alternatively
i met a B-type in period 1 and has history (ri = 0, rj = 1), since he received a
negative payoff at the hands of his partner.
In the conjectured equilibrium, if a player he hears a signal about another
player, he believes him to be a B-type with probability 1. This means that we
can combine (2.2.4) and Assumption 2 to give
Pr[{k is B-type} | ρi(k) = 1] = 1 (2.3.1)
Remark 2.3.1. The S-type player’s equilibrium strategy for period 3 is that he
exits if and only if he believes for sure that his partner is a B-type: either having
heard a signal about him or having matched with him in the previous period.
Otherwise, he defects.
Proof. Clearly, from Table 2.1, if i believes k is a B-type, his only rational action
is to choose exit. If i has not heard a signal, the probability20 that his partner
is a B-type is φ. By Assumption 1, this possibility of meeting a B-type is low
enough that expected payoffs from choosing defection are positive.
20In fact, player i’s updated subjective expected probability of each partner k being a B-type
could be lower than φ, and depends on the network probabilities of information transmission.
See Appendix 2.C.
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Given this equilibrium strategy, we can now identify the payoffs in period 3.
Proposition 4. Let V ji (k) be the period 3 expected payoffs in the repeated game
F for an S-type player i who met player j, in period 1, did not deviate, and then
meets player k 6= j, i in period 3. Period 3 payoffs are
V ji (k) = γik
[
σ(1− φ)− βφ(1−Qji (k))
]
(2.3.2)
Where Qji (k) is the conditional probability that an S-type i, having met another
S-type j in period 1, hears a signal about player k, if k is a B-type. If i meets
the same player j 6= i in both periods 1 and 3, payoffs are V ji (j) = σ if j was an
S-type and zero if j was a B-type (since i knows this type of his period 2 partner).
Finally, V ji (i) = 0 when i sits out.
Proof. for V ji (k) with k /∈ {i, j}, there are two possibilities: either k is a B-type,
or he is an S-type. With probability 1−φ, k is an S-type, and payoffs are γikσ as
the equilibrium strategy requires both players to defect. With probability φ, k is
a B-type, and player i’s strategy depends on whether or not he has heard a signal
about him. Let this probability of a signal being received be given by Qji (k). If i
has heard, he will choose exit with payoff 0. If he has not heard, he will choose
defection with payoff −β.





Proposition 4 shows how players benefit from being trusting : if there is
a higher probability that they receive a signal about a bad reputation, their
expected payoffs are increased, because they are more likely to have heard if their
partner is a B-type and hence choose exit against him and protect themselves.
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This is the period of the game where payoffs depend on a player’s ability to detect
types. Here payoffs are increased when a player is more likely to receive signals.
2.3.2 Period 2
The possibility of obstruction provides an action space for the players in period 2
of our cooperation game. In our model, all signals are true and are distinguished
only by their subject — the identity of the player whose bad reputation is being
transmitted. There are T rounds (or sub-periods) of information transmission
within period 2. Players need to decide whether to pass on signals about each of
the players, in each of the rounds of information transmission. This means that
the action space for each player in period 2 consists of
∏
k∈N,τ≤T{pass on signals
about player k in round τ , do not pass on signals about player k in round τ}.
Recall from the previous Section that the S-type players’ equilibrium strategy
in period 3 is {exit if a signal has been received about your partner, otherwise
defect}. We can now observe the following.
Proposition 5. When players’ equilibrium strategies in period 3 are those given
in Remark 2.3.1, and signals flow in period 2 through the network by obstructed
diffusion given in Definition 5 of Chapter 1, a player who is the subject of a signal
strictly prefers to conceal it, and players who are not the subject of a signal weakly
prefer to pass it on.
Proof. See Appendix.
This means that we can identify the network links through which a signal
about a player can travel in period 2 — it is all the network links except those
which include the player himself. We can now identify the probabilities that true
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signals emitted about deviations in the first round will travel through the network
by obstructed diffusion to the other players, given the information structure Ω.
These are the obstructed word-of-mouth probabilities given in Definition 6 in
Chapter 1.
While we have observed that the B-type will not pass on information about
himself, a player cannot infer anything about his neighbour’s type just because
he does not receive any signal from him. This is due to the stochastic nature of
information transmission. 21
2.3.3 Period 1
Next we examine conditions under which we can expect cooperation in period 1.
Consider the case where player i expects his period 1 partner j to cooperate.22 If
i defects, j will get a negative payoff and send a signal about it, and any S-type
player who receives that signal will exit if they are matched with i in period 3.








i (k)mik + σmij (recall that V
j
i (j) = σ




i mij be i’s ex ante expected payoffs
over all possible period 1 partners j. Now we can write player i’s overall
expected payoffs from either cooperating or defecting when his S-type partner
21However, a player can use the structure of the network to update his beliefs about the
likelihood of his period-3 partner being a B-type, given that he did not hear a signal about him.
This depends on the network links between his partner’s possible period 1 matches and himself
and is given in Appendix 2.C. These beliefs would not change his behaviour due to Assumption
1: he would only choose exit against a certain B-type.
22Note that meeting a B-type does not impact a player’s incentive for cooperation, because
he cannot impose a negative payoff on a B-type and hence cannot get a bad reputation from
defecting against him when he should have cooperated. Hence we can exclude the possibility of
meeting a B-type in period 1 from our study of the equilibrium incentives for cooperation. In




i (k)mik, which enter the expression for overall payoffs
given later in Proposition 9.
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j ) = αγij + δV
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As shown in (2.3.4), expected losses that i incurs if he defects against j who
cooperates are σ(1− φ)
∑
k 6=i γikpjk(i)mik, which is broken down as follows.
• The payoff from mutual defection in period 3 is σ (the ‘reward’ for
cooperation);
• He will only be punished if his future partner is an S-type, which happens
with probability (1− φ);
• Punishment occurs if a signal emitted by j about i reaches his potential
future partners k ∈ N \ i, the probability of which is given by pjk(i). This
is weighted by γikmik, the probability i matches with k, and the payoffs if
he does;
• This is summed over all k 6= i because if i matches with himself, payoffs
are zero. Meanwhile if he matches with j again, payoffs are also zero as j





j ) ≥ vi(D1i , C1j ) and we can rearrange (2.3.3)
and (2.3.4) to find that cooperation for i, when matched with a partner j who
he expects to cooperate, requires expected losses Lji from deviation to be above
23By Assumption 1, players will not exit against an unknown player in period 1: they either
cooperate or defect.
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a threshold L∗ij, where







We can say that if Lji ≥ L∗ij, then player i is trusted by player j. This is
because player i has an incentive such that if he expects player j to cooperate,
player i will also cooperate.
We can observe that a player’s propensity to cooperate is weakly increasing in
his own losses. Higher expected losses from a deviation are to a player’s advantage
because they give him an incentive to be honest. If losses are high enough, he is
more likely to be trusted, and therefore more likely to take part in cooperation,
with higher payoffs.
In particular, i’s expected losses from defecting against j are strictly increasing
in the probabilities that j can inform other players — i’s potential future matches
— about a deviation by i. Player i is more willing to cooperate with j, if j is
better able to inform other players about i’s bad behaviour. So it is better for
incentive-based trust if players can talk about each other.24 The extent of which
they can depends on the network structure and in fact, because of obstruction, on
the network structure that remains when each node is removed. This is because
each player is unable to commit to passing a message about their deviation, and
has to rely on others to do so, incentivising him with their threat of gossip.
Secondly, the probabilities of information transmission are weighted by the
matching probabilities. This is because a player not only cares whether his
deviation would be detected — he cares if it is detected by the players he is likely
24Larson (2017) finds a similar result in a different setting.
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to match with, because only a matched partner can carry out the punishment.
Expected losses would be quite low if a potential victim who was only able to
inform players who were unlikely to match with a deviator in period 3.
This period of the model is where incentives play the key role. When incentives
matter, a player wants others to be able to communicate about him, encouraging
him to cooperate. This is in contrast to period 3, which focuses on types, where
a player wants to be able to communicate about others.
2.3.3.1 Cooperation
We have noted that if a player’s expected losses are less than L∗ij, he would defect.
But if one player in a pair is tempted to defect, knowing this, their partner
will defect too, even if their losses would otherwise be high enough to deter a
deviation. So we need both partners in a pair to have high enough expected losses
for cooperation to occur: they must both be trusted by each other. Otherwise,
they both defect, coordinating on a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game and
both avoiding the bad reputation.25
Proposition 6. A pair of players will cooperate in period 1 if and only if the
expected losses of both players in the pair are above a threshold level, L∗ij for
player i matched with player j, ∀i, j ∈ N . Otherwise, they will both defect.
Proof. If Lji ≥ L∗ij and i expects j to cooperate, then i will also cooperate due to
(2.3.5). Similarly if Lij ≥ L∗ji, and j expects i to cooperate, j will also cooperate.
In contrast, if Lji ≥ L∗ij but i expects j to defect (which he would if Lij < L∗ji),
25As described earlier, we could apply this model to a one-sided trust game rather than a
two-sided cooperation (prisoners’ dilemma) game, and from that build a directed trust network
that shows which players would trust each other in the one-sided game.
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players in a pair will cooperate if and only if both players have losses above the
relevant threshold.
2.3.4 Payoffs and centrality
We can now show how equilibrium payoffs depend on centrality measures, which
we can find from the network of information transmission.
Proposition 7. For uniform random matching and γij = 1 ∀j 6= i ∀i ∈ N ,
period 3 expected payoffs are increasing in obstructed centrality Pi(Ω), given in
Definition 10 of Chapter 1. That is, ∂Vi
∂Pi
> 0 ∀i, j ∈ N . For general matching,
period 3 expected payoffs are increasing in a weighted version of obstructed
centrality.
Proof. See Appendix
Players’ obstructed centrality shows how network position affects the average
probability that players receive signals via the network. This shows, on average,
how trusting they are — that is, how easily they can receive signals from the
network about other players.
Proposition 8. In period 1, whether players are trusted or not is linked to their
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Which we can observe is a weighted version of obstructing centrality.
This shows us that the extent to which a player is trusted depends on their
obstructing centrality — that is, how easily other players can communicate about
them, when they cannot commit to pass information on about themselves. These
two results also highlight the symmetric case — when payoffs and matching
probabilities are the same for all players, and so γij = 1 ∀i, j with uniform
random matching. With symmetry, the two aspects of trust and the payoffs in
each period are directly linked to the centrality measures given in Chapter 1.
2.4 Welfare and the cooperation network
These equilibrium conditions mean that for any parameters of the model, we can
find out which players can cooperate with each other, and which ones cannot. We
list these cooperative pairs as the cooperation network, Gc, which is endogenous to
the information network G, the interaction network M and the other parameters.
Individual payoffs in period 1 depend on the number of cooperative relationships
each player has: that is, their degree (number of neighbours) in the cooperation
network. Hence welfare depends on the size of the trading world: that is, the
number of edges in Gc.
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1, if Lji ≥ L∗ij and Lij ≥ L∗ji
0, otherwise







(1− φ)(gcij + (1− gcij)σ)− φβ
]
+ δV ji − φδσmij
]
mij
Proof. This follows from (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
Figure 2.1 shows some example cooperation networks for a group of eight
players, and the information networks they depend on.26 We can now use the
previous results to show the effect of the probabilities of information transmission
on cooperation.
Proposition 10. Trust, cooperation and welfare are weakly increasing in the
probabilities of information transmission.
Proof. See Appendix.
The observation that more information supports cooperation and welfare
is intuitive, and supports Kandori’s (1992) assertion that information about
a player’s reputation can sustain cooperation within a community. It also
26Parameters for all examples are: α = 1.15, δ = 0.95, β = 1.3, σ = 0.7. We set T = 6, for the
example of a weekly market day, which would have 6 intervening days during which information
flows through the information network before the next market day. Banerjee et al. (2013) set
T using the number of visits to a village made by data collectors, an average of 6.6.
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Figure 2.1: Random networks of eight nodes: G and Gc
echoes results from imperfect private monitoring in infinitely repeated games by
Sekiguchi (1997) and Bhaskar and Obara (2002) where, providing that monitoring
is sufficiently accurate, the symmetric efficient payoff can be approximated.
Experimental evidence such as that by Gallo and Yan (2015) also finds that
information plays an important role in supporting cooperation.
We showed in Chapter 1 how the probabilities of information transmission are
weakly increasing in the three aspects of the information structure Ω. Combining
this with Proposition 10, we can observe that cooperation and welfare are weakly
increasing in the three aspects of Ω. We can also note that the cooperation
network defined in Proposition 9, which lists the cooperative pairs in the game
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F , is endogenous to the information network G, the matching probabilities M
and the other parameters of the model. We say that a community of N players
has full cooperation if and only if Lji ≥ L∗ij∀i, j ∈ N .
2.4.1 Example: the size of the trading world
Dixit (2003b) arranged a continuum of players on a circle such that, as the
distance between players around the circle increases, there is a decreasing
probability of information transmission and matching, and increasing payoffs.
Using this model, Dixit identified the ‘size of the trading world’, the arc of the
circle within which players can cooperate with each other. Let us illustrate
our approach and the result that increasing information can support higher
cooperation and welfare in networks by using this example.
We arrange players in groups, and then place the groups in a circular shape
within the information network. The four groups labelled A, B, C and D, each of
four players, and the connections between the groups, are shown in the top left of
Figure 2.2. These groups form an equitable partition (Allouch, 2017; Powers and
Sulaiman, 1982) in that each member of a group has the same number of links to
other groups. This structure leads to a greater probability that group members
receive signals from each other than from players in other groups, who are located
further away in the information network. We also assign increasing payoffs to
matches with players in more distant groups, so that γAA = 0.9, γAB = 1, and
γAD = 1.1, and this is symmetric for each group.
To use Dixit’s model, we need decreasing matching probabilities with further-
away groups — players should be most likely to meet their own group, then the
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Figure 2.2: ‘The size of the trading world’ for groups in a network
neighbouring group, and least likely to meet the furthest group. To find matching
probabilities that fit this bill, we use a simple approach where the probability of
two players meeting is inversely proportional to their social distance, up to a
maximum distance Tm, beyond which it is negligible but positive.
27 Let m1 be
the matching probabilities where Tm = 1 and players only have a non-negligible
probability of meeting their direct neighbours, m2 is the case when Tm = 2, etc.
mU gives uniform random matching where mij =
1
n−1 ∀ j 6= i and mii = 0.
In this example we use matching probabilities m3 which, since the diameter
of the information network is 3, means that all players have a non-negligible
27See the Appendix on local matching for details. There exist alternative approaches that
provide perfect matching and other desirable attributes, and we focus on this version only
because it is easily applicable to the examples we have chosen.
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probability of meeting. This structure gives us matching probabilities of: 0.105
for direct neighbours; 0.053 for players at social distance 2; and 0.035 for players
at social distance 3.
Having translated Dixit’s model into a network setting, we can see that our
‘cooperation network’ is analogous to Dixit’s ‘trading world’. The top right of
Figure 2.2 shows the cooperation network at p = 0.22. Cooperative links are
only present within groups: at this low level of p, players can only cooperate
with members of their own group. The lower two graphics in Figure 2.2 show
that as p increases and information is more likely to flow along the links of the
information network, players can cooperate with members of their neighbouring
groups, and then with groups further away. Welfare increases as there are more
links in the cooperation network: that is, the size of the trading world increases.
This illustrates the effect of increasing information transmission on the level of
cooperation in this example.
2.4.2 Example: the dilution of social capital
A key observation from the expression for expected losses in (2.3.5) was that
cooperation is more likely if a potential victim can tell the deviator’s future
partners about his behaviour. And while the information network determines who
the victim can communicate with, it is the matching probabilities that determine
whether or not those recipients of the signal are likely to be matched with the
deviator in future. Therefore the joint configuration of the matching probabilities
and information network are very important for the pattern of cooperation in our
repeated game.
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Figure 2.3: ‘The dilution of social capital’ for groups in a network
Figure 2.3 shows an example where, for a given information network, changes
in matching probabilities affect the overall level of cooperation. The information
network is shown in the top left, with two groups A and B of eight players each,
who are completely connected within the group, and where each player has one
connection in the other group. As before there are higher payoffs for playing the
other group: γAA = 1, γAB = 1.1; now p = 0.12.
The cooperation network under m1 is shown in the top right of Figure 2.3,
while the cases with m2 and mU are shown in the lower left. This shows how the
cooperation network with m1 just connects players within each group: so when
players are only likely to meet their direct neighbours in the information network,
they can cooperate within their own group but not with the other group. With
m2 and mU , there is an increased likelihood that players can meet those in the
other group, and we get the somewhat surprising result that compared to m1,
this leads to the breakdown of cooperation within each group. This is because
there is a much lower probability of a signal being received between groups, than
within groups. If a player meets someone from his own group in period 1, it is
not likely that they will be able to inform someone from the other group about
any deviation. So if there is a good chance that a player is matched outside his
group in period 3, the probability that he will be punished for a deviation against
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someone in his own group is lower, and he will be tempted to deviate against
them. This tallies with the case of ‘dilution of social capital’ described by Meagher
(2006), where the entry of additional groups into the informal sector of garment
and shoe production in Aba in South-Eastern Nigeria reduced cooperation within
the groups that were already occupying the sector.
2.4.2.1 Cooperation and social distance
In these examples we have shown two cases where players only cooperate within
their groups and are not able to trust or cooperate with players in other
groups. This echoes experimental work finding decreasing cooperation with
increased social distance by Chandrasekhar et al. (2014) and Riyanto and Yeo
(2014), among others. Our model identifies two mechanisms which could lead
to this outcome: if, as social distance increases, either or both of the matching
probabilities or the probabilities of information transmission decrease.
2.5 Trust and obstruction
Having shown that a network which supports greater information transmission
can support more cooperation, next we analyse the effect of different network
positions on individual levels of trust, cooperation and payoffs. We identified two
aspects of trust — players are trusted if other players can send and receive signals
about them, whereas they are trusting if they are likely to receive signals about
other players. Now we examine how network positions are linked with these two
aspects of trust.
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2.5.1 Trust and visibility
Following from our observations in the previous Section, it is clear that if player
i emits a signal about player k, the probabilities that the signal is received by
other players are determined by player i’s position in G−k, the network omitting
k. From Definition 6, we can see that obstructed word-of-mouth probabilities
are zero if the social distance between players is greater than T , the maximum
number of links that a signal can travel. This means that i’s signal about k
could only be received by players at a social distance of T or less from i in G−k.
Players can communicate if there is a positive probability that a signal sent by
one of them will be received by the other. As defined in Chapter 1, a player k
is visible if pij(k,Ω) > 0 ∀ i, j ∈ N \ k: that is, k is visible if everyone can
communicate about him. By Remark 1.4.1 in Chapter 1, if the network is 2-
connected and maxk∈N{DG−k} ≤ T , all players are visible. If, in addition p = 1,
then pij(k,Ω) = 1 ∀ i, j, k, which is equivalent to perfect information.









i (k)mik, a player’s potential losses from a deviation can reach his total
period 3 payoff if and only if he is visible. In particular,
• Player i is visible ⇐⇒ Lji ≤ V
j
i ∀j.
• If player i is not visible such that DG−i > T but G−i is connected, then for









• If G−i is not connected then Lji < V
j
i ∀j.
Only a visible player has a positive probability that everyone could find out
if he deviates against any of his matches, so only a visible player can risk the
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maximum losses from a deviation in every match. If a player is not visible, then
he cannot lose his total period 3 payoffs from a deviation in some (or all) of
his matches. This lack of visibility reduces his losses and hence his likelihood of
cooperation.
The link between player i’s visibility and the connectedness of G−i echoes
the importance of 2-connectedness for cooperation that is highlighted by Renault
and Tomala (1998) and Wolitzky (2014), because 2-connectedness is clearly a
necessary condition for visibility. Like Kinateder (2008), we also find that the
diameter of the network is important for cooperation, although in our case —
because of obstruction — it is the diameter of the network that remains when
a player is removed that matters. In fact, a sufficient condition for player i’s
visibility is that DG−i ≤ T .
2.5.2 Example: star network
We can illustrate the importance of 2-connectedness with an example information
network: the star network, shown in the top left of Figure 2.1 with eight players.
The star network is not 2-connected with respect to the centre because without
him, all other players — the periphery — are singletons. On the other hand,
the network is 2-connected with respect to the periphery players because they
would not disconnect the network by their absence. Since the star network is not
2-connected with respect to all nodes, it is not 2-connected.
The cooperation network in the case of uniform random matching is shown
in the lower left of Figure 2.1 (p = 0.5). Perhaps surprisingly, we observe that
the player in the centre of the star cannot cooperate with any other player, while
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Figure 2.1: Star network with eight players
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the players on the periphery can all cooperate with each other. To find out why,
we can look at the losses in each partnership, shown in the chart on the right
of Figure 2.1. The solid red line denotes the threshold losses L∗ that must be
attained by both players in a match to ensure cooperation 28. The crosses show
player 2’s losses from defecting in each of his partnerships, and the triangles show
his partners’ losses.
We can see that player 1, in the centre of the star, can trust player 2 on the
periphery. This is because 2’s losses from a deviation against 1 are high, since a
signal emitted by 1 about 2’s deviation only has to travel one link to be received
by the other periphery players — 2’s potential future partners. But 2 cannot
trust 1 in return, because 1’s losses when matched with 2 are below the threshold
line L∗. This is because if 1 were to deviate against 2, player 1 would obstruct
any signal 2 would send about it — and without 1, player 2 is a singleton and so
could not tell anyone. So 2 expects 1 to defect and therefore will also defect, and
cooperation breaks down between them. This structure recalls the gatekeeping
and end network effects highlighted by Lippert and Spagnolo (2011), because
player 1 acts like a ‘gatekeeper’ of the information network with respect to the
periphery players. In fact, the periphery nodes could cooperate with the centre
if they had additional links to each other. This recalls Myerson’s (2008) model
of an autocrat whose support depends on the ability of his ‘courtiers’ to observe
his behaviour towards each of them, ensuring fairness.
On the other hand, as shown in the chart, periphery players have relatively
high losses when matched with each other, and these are symmetric, so they can
all cooperate with each other. This is because player 1 in the centre of the star
28This threshold is the same for all players since γij = 1 ∀j 6= i in this example.
91
2. Cooperation in networks
Figure 2.2: Line network with eight players
provides a walk of length two between all the periphery players, so a signal is very
likely to pass between them if any of them deviate, leading to high losses and
therefore more trust. The centre of the star misses out on cooperation himself,
but supports cooperation by the other players, by ensuring they can communicate
with each other.
For a given number of players in a connected information network that is
informative and a tree, Remark 1.4.3 in Chapter 1 showed that the star network
has the most visible players of any tree configuration. This means that the star
network has the most partnerships with maximum losses, of any tree network.
2.5.3 Example: line network
We can illustrate the links between payoffs and the different centrality measures
using the line network of eight players, shown in the top left of Figure 2.2. The
cooperation network with uniform random matching is shown in the bottom
left, and payoffs and obstructed centrality are shown on the right. Obstructed
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centrality increases for those players located nearer to the centre of the line. As
expected from Proposition 7, period 3 payoffs rise monotonically with obstructed
centrality, because players who are more likely to receive information from the
network are more trusting.
On the other hand, there is a non-monotonic relationship between period 1
payoffs and obstructed centrality. The chart shows that players 2, 3, 6 and 7
have the highest cooperation levels in equilibrium, but only moderate levels of
obstructed centrality. Looking at the cooperation network, we can see the same
pattern: players 1 and 8 are not able to cooperate with anyone, and players 4
and 5 have fewer links in the cooperation network than players 2, 3, 6 and 7.
This non-monotonic relationship between centrality ranking and cooperation is
similar to a concept known as middle-status conformity, identified by sociologists
Phillips and Zuckerman (2001), where those with a ‘middle’ level of status or
ranking are most likely to conform to society’s norms. In another setting, Butler
et al. (2009) also find a non-monotonic relationship between payoffs and trust.
2.5.3.1 A counterfactual without obstruction
We can use word-of-mouth probabilities — without obstruction — as a useful
counterfactual to investigate the effect of obstruction on cooperation in this
network. These are given in Definition 2 in Chapter 1 and allow us to
construct counterfactual expected losses without obstruction, that is LW ji =∑
k wjk(Ω)V
j






i (k)mik. These gives us a
counterfactual cooperation network, showing which players would cooperate, were
it not for obstruction. This hypothetical network (not shown) includes additional
cooperative links between players: 4 with 2, 3 and 5; and 5 with 4, 6 and 7.
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This means that the losses without obstruction — LW ji — for the partners of
players 1 and 8 are still too low to deter defection; we say that 1 and 8 have poor
network positions in an absolute sense because they are too ‘tempting’ for anyone
to cooperate with, even if they did not obstruct their signals: they can trust no-
one. On the other hand, we find that 4 and 5 have three more cooperative links
in the counterfactual network; in fact the non-monotonic relationship between
cooperation and obstructed centrality disappears when we remove the effect of
obstruction. We say that 4 and 5 have poor relative network positions because
they would have cooperated, were it not for their obstruction of signals. Players
with poor network positions in either sense reduce cooperation levels and hence
welfare.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the extent of cooperation in a finitely repeated game in
a network setting. We apply Dixit (2003b)’s continuous model to a network:
a discrete community of players who occupy its nodes. The players are
randomly matched in pairs in the first and last periods, and play the stage
game of a modified prisoners’ dilemma. From the fixed information network, the
model allows us to generate an endogenous network of potentially cooperative
relationships. From this we can characterise how levels of cooperation depend on
the structure of the information network. Individual players’ payoffs are linked to
whether their network positions mean they are trusting and/or trusted. Players
are trusting if they are likely to receive information from the network, while
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they are trusted if others can pass signals about them. A pair of players can
only cooperate if they are both trusted by each other. Using the word-of-mouth
probabilities for information transmission developed in Chapter 1, and find that
cooperation and welfare both increase with these probabilities.
We find that players with higher obstructed centrality (constructed from
the probabilities of information transmission) receive more information from
the network and hence are more trusting. But there can be a non-monotonic
relationship between centrality and the extent to which players are trusted,
leading to cooperation patterns with middle-status conformity. This is interesting
because one might expect the most central player to have the highest payoffs,
while we find that a player’s central position may actually reduce his capacity to
be trusted by others. This is because players cannot commit to pass on a signal
about their own bad reputation. Knowing this, players who rely on a central
player for information transmission may not trust him, because they know he
will obstruct any signal that they send to warn others about his bad reputation.
This highlights the importance of 2-connectedness and cycles for cooperation and
welfare, because these structures can prevent players from completely obstructing
signals about their reputations travelling between other players, ensuring that
they are visible. Since the non-monotonic relationship between cooperation and
centrality disappears in our counterfactual example of a line network without
obstruction, we conjecture (though we have no formal proof) that general results
may exist linking middle-status conformity to line networks, or other acyclic
networks.
The possible link between middle-status conformity and acyclic networks
may also be of empirical interest. There is some experimental evidence that
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players with high centrality may be less ‘reciprocal’ in trust games (Riyanto
and Yeo, 2014; Barr et al., 2009). Obstruction may also imply that acyclic
networks are less likely to be observed in communities that use this kind of
community enforcement mechanism. Where acyclic networks are present, we
may find that central individuals seek other ways to dampen the negative effect
of obstruction on their capacity to cooperate. For example, they may enlist their
own neighbours (not just the neighbours of their potential victim) as witnesses
to observe their actions, increasing their potential losses and making them more
trustworthy. Secondly, obstructive, bridging players may specialise in information
transmission: even though they cannot pass signals about themselves and are
hence not trusted, they could share in the benefits of cooperation if transfers from
other cooperating parties can be arranged. Finally, local matching may have a
mitigating effect because if someone is more likely to meet the same player again,
he will have higher losses from deviating against them, even if that player cannot
communicate with others due to obstruction.
Some interesting extensions suggest themselves. The model looks only at the
case of a bad reputation, and there may be interesting effects when a ‘good label’
rather than a bad one is emitted, or both, as in Spence (1973) and Breza and
Chandrasekhar (2015). It could also be interesting to introduce some stochasticity
in order to investigate the effect of risk on cooperative relationships, as observed
by Baker (1984). Lastly, it may be possible to use the model to investigate the
interaction of formal and informal enforcement regimes, as examined by Kranton
(1996), Dhillon and Rigolini (2011) and Dixit (2003a).
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2.A A good reputation
In our framework, an alternative specification with a good signal would work as
follows.
Period 3 For punishment to work, there would be a parametric assumption that
a player would only be rewarded for cooperation in the first round if a good
signal about them was received by their final-round partner. This means
that if a player received a good signal about their partner in the final round
they would they defect, and otherwise they would punish (exit). Hence
Assumption 1 could no longer hold. And it would imply that some S-type
players would be punished in equilibrium, because a signal was not received
by their partner - in contrast to our model with a bad signal, where only
the B-types are punished.
Period 2 With a good signal, this would mean everyone had an incentive to pass
on a signal about themselves and about other players. This is because the
reward for cooperation (mutual defection) would only be possible if both
partners received a good signal about each other. This means there would
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be no obstruction.
Period 1 In the first round, incentives to be honest would depend on the
probability that a good signal emitted by a player’s partner would reach
his future partners, in the same way as the current model - but without
obstruction. However, because Assumption 1 would not hold, players who
could not cooperate would coordinate on the Nash equilibrium of mutual
exit, rather than mutual defection.
This is an interesting thought experiment because it suggests that there may
be different welfare impacts of either good or bad signals in different networks and
with different parameters. On one hand, cooperation might be higher with a good
signal because there is no obstruction and so greater probabilities of information
transmission. But on the other hand, welfare might be lower because some S-types
would be wrongly punished in period 3, and because non-cooperating partners in
period 1 could not defect, only exit.
2.B Proofs
2.B.1 Proof of Remark 2.3.2
Qji (k) is the conditional probability that, if player k is a B-type, an S-type player
i who matched with another S-type player j in period 1 will hear a signal about
player k:
Qji (k) ≡ Pr
[
ρi(k) = 1 | {k is B-type}, ri = rj = 0, k, µ1k /∈ {i, j}
]
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By the law of total expectations, Qji (k) is given by:
Pr
[












µ1k = h | k, µ1k /∈ {i, j}
]]
The second term is
Pr
[
µ1k = h | k, µ1k /∈ {i, j}
]
=
Pr [(µ1k = h) ∩ (k, µ1k /∈ {i, j})]





∀ h /∈ {i, j}
0 ∀ h ∈ {i, j}
The first term is
Pr
[




0 ∀ k ∈ {i, j}
0 ∀ h ∈ {i, j}
phi(k) otherwise
Therefore Qji (i) = Q
j





∀ k /∈ {i, j} (2.B.1)
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2.B.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Assume γij = 1 ∀i, j WLG. In Definition 5 we assumed that the probability
of information travelling along each walk is independent, implying that players
only recall signals they receive in the last round of information transmission, and
forget signals received and passed on in earlier rounds. There are four cases.
An S-type player and a signal about himself: This S-type player has deviated
in period 1. He will have strictly lower payoffs if his future partner is an S-type
and has heard about his deviation, because they will exit against him instead of
defecting. His period 3 payoffs are unchanged if he meets a B-type (because a
B-type would not ‘punish him’. He could match with anyone in period 3 (because
mij > 0 ∀ j 6= i) and because he does not know which of these players are S-
types and which are B-types, he does not want any of them to find out about his
deviation. Therefore he will strictly prefer to conceal a signal about himself from
all other players. This holds for all rounds of information transmission.
An S-type player and a signal about someone else: S-type players are not
expecting another S-type to deviate, so a signal about another player would tell
them that he is a B-type. An S-type player who has heard a signal about a
B-type player, and meets him in period 3, has payoff 0. If he has not heard the
signal, his payoff on meeting a B-type is −β. If he meets an S-type, his payoffs
are unchanged by hearing a signal about a B-type. As he could meet any of the
players in period 3, an S-type player strictly prefers to receive a signal about a
B-type.
However it is not the case that passing on a signal always increases the
probability that it is received. Sometimes it may have no effect. For example, a
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player passing on a signal in round T cannot increase his probability of receiving a
signal, since it will not have time to return to him, as there are no more rounds of
information transmission. So he is indifferent between the actions of either passing
on a signal or not in round T . However, if players do not pass on the signal in
round T , they cannot increase their probability of receiving it by passing it on in
round T − 1, and so information transmission could quickly unravel. Specifically,
a player can strictly increase his probability of receiving a signal by passing it on,
if and only if other players pass it on in the following rounds, and he is part of a
walk that returns to his network position in a number of links which is a factor of
the number of information transmission rounds remaining. We can observe that
the strategy for all S-type players to pass on signals about other players in all
rounds is weakly preferred.
A B-type player and a signal about himself: A B-type’s payoffs are x/2 if
his future partner has heard the signal and x otherwise, so he strictly prefers to
conceal a signal about himself.
A B-type player and a signal about someone else: In this case, a B-type’s
payoffs in period 3 are not affected by whether he has heard a signal about
another B-type or not. So he is indifferent between passing signals about other
players and not passing them. Therefore the strategy to pass on signals about all
other players in all rounds is weakly preferred. This means that in our model a
B-type player has the same strategy for passing on signals as does an S-type. This
seems reasonable: a B-type player may not wish to draw attention to himself by
not passing on signals about other players, when it would not decrease his payoffs
to do so.
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2.B.3 Proof of Proposition 7
For uniform random matching and when γij = 1 ∀j 6= i ∈ N (γii = 0), we
want to show that period 3 payoffs are increasing in obstructed centrality, which









Ex ante, i could meet any player k in period 3, and any player j in period 1. So
we want to find Vi, the average expected period 3 payoffs over any k and any j,

















σ(1− φ)− βφ(1−Qji (k))
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k 6=i Pi(k) = Pi. We can substitute
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[(n− 1)Pi − Pi] = Pi
And therefore from (2.B.2) we have that ∂Vi
∂Pi
= βφ > 0, as required.
In the case of general matching, (2.3.2) shows that the only way that
network probabilities affect payoffs is via Qji (k). Clearly
∂V ji (k)
∂Qji (k)
= φβ > 0 as
required. Let
∑










































h6=i phi(k)mhk = P
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Clearly, the second term is another weighted version of Pi(k), but using different
weights to Pmi (k). Averaging both these terms over k means that we have a
weighted version of Pi, which we call P
X
i . We have that
∂Vi
∂PXi
= βφ > 0 as
required.
2.B.4 Proof of Proposition 10
The expression for each player’s utility given in Proposition 9 is strictly
increasing in both the number of cooperative partnerships, and in period 3
payoffs. From Proposition 6 the number of cooperative partnerships is weakly
increasing in the losses in each partnership, and from (2.3.5) losses are strictly
increasing in information transmission probabilities. From Proposition 7, period
3 payoffs are increasing in information transmission probabilities. Putting these
together, overall utility is weakly increasing in the probabilities of information
transmission. So more information, in the sense of greater probabilities of
information transmission, weakly increases the levels of cooperation and welfare
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in this repeated game.
2.C Updated subjective probabilities
If i meets k in period 3 and has not heard any signal, there are two possibilities:
either k is an S-type; or k is a B-type but i has not heard about it. Player i will
still defect against the unknown player k due to Assumption 1. Now φji (k) is his
updated belief that k is a B-type player, given that he has heard no signal about
him, that is:
φji (k) ≡ Pr[{k is B-type} | ρi(k) = 6©, ri = rj = 0, k, µ1k /∈ {i, j}]
Let Qji (k) be the conditional probability that, if k is a B-type, an S-type player
i who matched with another S-type player j in period 1 will hear a signal about
player k (see next subsection).
Qji (k) ≡ Pr
[
ρi(k) = 1 | {k is B-type}, ri = rj = 0, k, µ1k /∈ {i, j}
]
To find φji (k), we need the following expressions:
Pr
[



















2. Cooperation in networks
Using the final equation from this list and Bayes’ rule we have that
φji (k) = Pr[{k is B-type} | ρi(k) = 6©, ri = rj = 0, k, µ1k /∈ {i, j}]
=
φ(1−Qji (k))





2.D Local matching based on social distance
As discussed in Section 2.2, we might expect that matching probabilities would
decrease as social distance increases, which we call local matching. Here we
propose a simple form for this function. For this purpose, we assume there is
a parameter, Tm, which gives the maximum social distance over which players
have a non-negligible probability of matching. Since our model requires a positive
probability for any pair to match, beyond Tm we assume the matching probability
is negligible but positive.





λ, so that matching probabilities are inversely proportional to their social
distance.
As set out in Subsection 2.2.2, any matching probabilities in our model must
meet the following conditions: mij = mji ∀i, j ∈ N ; mij > 0 ∀ j 6= i ∈ N ;∑
jmij = 1 and mii ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N . It now remains to identify λ in order to specify
our function m(·).
Since we have that
∑
jmij = 1, assume for a moment that there is no sitting
out and mii = 0 ∀i ∈ N , since 1dii(G) is not defined. Then we can define λi as
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j 6=i s.t. dij(G)≤Tm
mij =
∑










Then let λ = maxi∈N{λi} and use this to calculate the pairwise matching
probabilities mij. For any i such that
∑





jmij = 1 ∀i, as required.
This means that m1 gives the matching probabilities where Tm = 1 and
players only have a non-negligible probability of meeting their direct neighbours.
Now λi = |Ni| and λ is the maximum degree of the network. We have that
mij = 1/λ ∀i 6= j, which means that mii = 1 − |Ni|λ ∀i. Players with the
maximum degree have mii = 0 and they never sit out. Let m
2 be the case when
Tm = 2, m
3 be when Tm = 3, etc. Meanwhile m
U gives uniform random matching
where mij =
1





3. Redistribution in networks
3.1 Introduction
Research on the private provision of public goods has been, from the first, focused
on welfare implications. Important results by Malinvaud (1972), Warr (1983) and
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) (henceforth BBV) show firstly, that the
public good is under-provided relative to the efficient level; and secondly, that
income redistribution that leaves the set of contributors unchanged is ‘neutral’.
Neutrality means that contributors adjust their contributions to exactly offset
the transfer, meaning that there is no change in provision levels or welfare from
such a policy.
Public goods are often ‘local’ in the sense that consumers only benefit from
the provision of their direct neighbours. Hence the network context, where local
influences are heterogeneous among consumers, is a natural setting to examine
private provision of public goods. In a key contribution, Bramoullé and Kranton
(2007) show that when neighbours’ actions are perfect strategic substitutes,
specialised Nash equilibria correspond to the maximal independent sets of the
network. Bramoullé, Kranton and d’Amours (2014) investigated the whole range
of strategic substitution and identified a threshold of impact related to the lowest
eigenvalue of the network. Below the threshold, the uniqueness and stability of a
Nash equilibrium hold. Beyond it, multiple Nash equilibria will in general exist,
and stability holds only for corner equilibria. Allouch (2015) extends this model
to the non-linear case, with a condition on the normality of the public good which
follows BBV’s approach.29
29Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) first showed that consumers’ equilibrium were
proportional to their ‘Bonacich’ centrality (Bonacich, 1987), a measure which gives the number
of walks throughout the network that begin from each consumer. Other recent and relevant
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Allouch (2015) also shows that neutrality no longer holds for incomplete
networks, opening the door to policy interventions that could improve welfare.
Redistribution of endowments is the benchmark policy choice, as shown in the
Second Welfare Theorem. Unlike the competitive equilibrium, where efficiency
is always assured and welfare is only affected in a normative sense through
improvements to equity, with private provision, neither equilibrium (before or
after redistribution) is efficient. Allouch (2017) first investigated the benchmark
policy of income redistribution between contributors, focusing on preferences that
yield affine Engel curves30 and using a standard utilitarian approach. These
were based on income redistribution involving ‘relatively small’ budget-balanced
transfers between players which leave the set of contributors unchanged. The
findings show that transfers to consumers with the lowest Bonacich centrality
increased welfare, by simultaneously reducing aggregate public good provision and
increasing aggregate consumption. Low Bonacich centrality consumers who are,
in the case of strategic substitutes, the most central consumers in the network, are
actually those who could free-ride the most by virtue of their network position.
When they provide relatively more public goods, spillovers increase. So those
consumers whose network position means they have the lowest propensity to
contribute, are exactly those who should be induced to increase their provision.
contributions to the network literature include those by Galeotti et al. (2010); Ghiglino and
Goyal (2010); Elliott and Golub (2015); Acemoglu et al. (2016); Kinateder and Merlino (2017);
Bourlès et al. (2017) and López-Pintado (2017).
30Known also as Gorman (1961) of which Cobb-Douglas is a special case.
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3.1.1 Policy reform
This chapter explores the pattern of welfare impacts due to income redistribution
with general preferences and a weighted welfare social function. For complete
networks, neutrality leads to an invariance of private consumption — as well as
welfare — from income redistribution. Beyond complete networks, neutrality does
not hold generally, so this type of redistribution does have welfare implications.
This insight can be used to illuminate the optimal direction of policy reform in
the tradition of Dixit (1975), Guesnerie (1977), Weymark (1981) and Ahmad
and Stern (1984). In our case policy reform consists of infinitesimally and
relatively small budget-balanced transfers between players which leave the set
of contributors unchanged.
This chapter offers two main contributions. Firstly, we provide a new
perspective on the neutrality result by showing that it corresponds to a change
of direction in the policy impact. To do so, we show that a transfer affects
each consumer only insofar as it affects the consumer’s neighbourhood. That is,
it is the aggregate transfer to the consumer’s neighbourhood, rather than the
individual transfer to the consumer, that affects consumption. As a consequence,
we identify the −1 eigenvalue, as not only the condition for neutral transfers,
but also the switch point of the impact of a transfer on each consumer’s
neighbourhood, and therefore as key to the outcome of income redistribution.
Secondly, we characterise two mutually exclusive cases — either there is a
Pareto-improving income redistribution, or if not, we can identify the implicit
welfare weights of the initial private provision equilibrium. As a consequence,
our policy reform analysis leads to a full characterisation of the welfare impact
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of infinitesimally and relatively small income redistribution between contributors
to local public goods.
Finally we illustrate these scenarios with two core-periphery networks and
establish rather surprising results: although consumers’ provision levels may
respond positively when they receive transfers, the direction of consumption
changes may not be in the same direction as the transfer. Whether transfers
and consumption/utility move in the same direction or not depends on the
architecture of the network. This is because a consumer’s utility indirectly
depends on their ‘social wealth’, which includes not only an individual’s own
income but also the total public good provision of his neighbours. We identify
cases where the recipient of the welfare-improving transfer is made individually
worse off: a type of ‘transfer paradox’ (Leontief, 1936; Samuelson, 1952; Yano,
1983; Balasko, 2014; Rasmusen and Kang, 2016). We identify examples of both
strong and weak transfer paradoxes, and find a particular case of networks where
there is a Pareto improvement that does not depend on preferences but only on
the structure of the network.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the general model,
and Section 3.3 describes results linked to neutrality. Section 3.4 describes the
social welfare implications of income redistribution, Section 3.5 provides some
examples of the results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 The general model
We consider a society comprising n consumers who occupy the nodes of a fixed
network g of social interactions. Let G = [gij] denote the adjacency matrix of
the network g, where gij = 1 indicates that consumer i 6= j are neighbours and
gij = 0 otherwise. The adjacency matrix of the network, G, is symmetric with
non-negative entries and therefore has a complete set of real eigenvalues (not
necessarily distinct), denoted by λmax(G) = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn = λmin(G),
where λmax(G) is the largest eigenvalue and λmin(G) is the lowest eigenvalue of
G. By the Perron–Frobenius Theorem, it holds that λmax(G) ≥ −λmin(G) > 0.
Consumer i’s neighbours in the network g are given by Ni. The preferences
of each consumer i are represented by a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, and strictly quasi-concave utility function ui(xi, qi + Q−i), where
xi is consumer i’s private good consumption, qi is consumer i’s public good
provision, and Q−i =
∑
j∈Ni qj is the sum of public good provisions of consumer
i’s neighbours in the society. Furthermore, the public good can be produced
from the private good via a unit-linear production technology. That is, any non-
negative quantity of the private good can be converted into the same quantity
of the public good. For simplicity, the prices of the private good and the public




ui(xi, qi +Q−i) (3.2.1)
s.t. xi + qi = wi and qi ≥ 0,
where wi is his income (exogenously fixed). The utility maximisation problem
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s.t. xi +Qi = wi +Q−i and Qi ≥ Q−i,
where consumer i chooses his (local) public good consumption, Qi = qi + Q−i.
Let γi be the Engel curve of consumer i.
31 Then consumer i’s local public good
demand depends on wi +Q−i, each player’s ‘social wealth’ (Becker, 1974):
Qi = max{γi(wi +Q−i), Q−i},
or, equivalently,
qi = Qi −Q−i = max{γi(wi +Q−i)−Q−i, 0}. (3.2.3)
Definition 12. Network normality. (Allouch, 2015) For each consumer





Theorem 3.2.1. (Allouch, 2015) Assume network normality. Then there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods on networks.
31We could also find the demand curve, which would include prices in the function, but here
prices are unchanged at 1.
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3.2.1 Income redistribution in general networks
This section investigates the impact of a social planner’s intervention on
the private provision of public goods. The social planner aims to achieve
socially optimal outcomes by drawing on income redistribution as a policy
instrument. Income redistribution takes the form of lump-sum transfers, which
are traditionally viewed as a benchmark for other policy instruments. Like Warr
(1983) and BBV we focus our analysis on income redistributions that leave the
set of contributors unchanged, referring to them as ‘relatively small’.
In general, there are compelling reasons for presuming that not all consumers
will be contributing to public goods. In the following, for simplicity of notations,
we will focus our analysis on just one component of contributors by passing to
the subnetwork induced by the component.32
Let q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n) be the Nash equilibrium associated with w =





Where transfers could be a tax (ti < 0) or a subsidy (ti ≥ 0). Let qt = (qt1, . . . , qtn)
be the Nash equilibrium after an income transfer t, that is, the Nash equilibrium
corresponding to the income distribution w + t = (w1 + t1, . . . , wn + tn)
T . We say
that a transfer t is ‘neutral’ if for each i
(xti , Q
t





32Note that if we pass our analysis to several components of contributors, while we can fully
characterise the provision of public goods, we can no longer consider the consumption or welfare
of non-contributors.
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The question of neutrality has been to a large extent settled for pure public goods
by the neutrality result of Warr (1983) and BBV. Their neutrality result shows
that contributors exactly offset their public good provision by the value of the
transfer so that for each consumer i it holds that qti − q∗i = ti, leading to an
unchanged private good consumption:
xti = wi + ti − qti = wi − q∗i = x∗i












We examine the case of general networks where, rather than pure public goods,
players only benefit from their neighbours’ public good provision. Pure public
goods are equivalent to the special case of a complete network where everyone is
connected to everyone else.
Proposition 11. Assume network normality and that all consumers are
contributors. Then, for any relatively small transfer t, the change in consumers’
private and public good consumption after the transfer are given by:
Qt −Q∗ = (A−1 − I)[xt − x∗] = (A−1 − I)(I + AG)−1A(I + G) t
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 11 shows that a transfer impacts each consumer’s consumption
of either the public or private good only insofar as it impacts his neighbourhood,
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i ∪Ni. Let us denote (I + G)t as the ‘neighbourhood transfer’ : the aggregate
tax/transfer in the neighbourhood of each consumer i. The neighbourhood
transfer determines how transfers impact consumers in terms of their consumption
of either the public or private good. In particular, it follows that
Corollary 2. A transfer t is neutral if and only if
(I + G) t = 0.
Corollary 2 shows that a transfer t is neutral if and only if t is an eigenvector33
with a corresponding eigenvalue of −1. This is because in this case (I + G)t =
(1 + λi)t = 0 and hence the neighbourhood transfer is null for each consumer.
More generally, it follows from Proposition 11 that if the transfer is an
eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue of λi, then the neighbourhood transfer
follows the same direction as the individual transfer if λi > −1, and is in the
opposite direction if λi < −1. Therefore, the neighbourhood transfer changes
from one direction to another depending on the eigenvalue λi, and the point at
which the direction switches is the −1 eigenvalue. The point of policy neutrality
is also a change of direction of policy impact.
Observe that we cannot say whether the eventual impact on consumption
of public and private goods will be positive or negative, since the direction of
the impact will also depend on the matrix (I + AG)−1A. In the simple case




i , we have the following
result.
33As G is a symmetric square matrix, then its eigenvectors are orthogonal and provide a
basis for the space Rn. This means that the vectors of possible transfers t can be associated
with any of the eigenvectors of G.
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Figure 3.1: A network g with six nodes
Corollary 3. Assume Cobb-Douglas preferences. If the transfer t is an
eigenvector of the adjacency matrix G associated with eigenvalue λi, then it holds
that
Qt −Q∗ = 1− a
a
(xt − x∗) = (1− a) (I + aG)−1(I + G) t = (1− a) 1 + λi
1 + aλi
t.
Having assumed network normality throughout the chapter, we note that
this is equivalent to a ∈]0,− 1
λmin(G)
[ in the C-D case, which ensures that the
denominator is positive. This means that if the transfer t is an eigenvector of
the adjacency matrix with a corresponding eigenvalue λi, then the impact of the
transfer on each consumer is in the same direction of the transfer if λi > −1 and
is in the opposite direction if λi < −1.
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3.2.2 Example
We can illustrate this result with an example network, shown in Figure 3.1. Some
of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the network are below.


























If the budget-balanced transfers t have directions t = (1, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1)
corresponding to the eigenvalue λ3 = 0, we can find the neighbourhood transfer
by applying (I + G)t = (1 + λ3)t = t: it is the same. On the other hand if t =
(0, 0, 1,−1, 0, 0), corresponding to the eigenvalue λ6 = −2, then when we apply
(I + G)t = (1 + λ6)t = −t, we find that the neighbourhood transfer is exactly
opposite to the individual transfers. Finally the effect of t = (0, 0, 1,−1, 0, 0)
corresponding to the eigenvalue λ4 = −1 is given by (I + G)t = (1 + λ4)t = 0:
neutrality.
3.3 Neutrality space
Next we investigate how the network structure affects policy reform in networks.
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3.3.1 A spectral characterisation
Consider first the linear subspace of budget-balanced transfers, the transfer
space T, which has dimension n− 1:
T = {t ∈ Rn | 1 · t = 0} = 1⊥. (3.3.1)
As we noted in Corollary 2, a vector of neutral transfers are the eigenvectors
associated with the −1 eigenvalue. Since transfers are budget-balanced, that is,
orthogonal to the vector of all ones, 1, this means we can characterise the space
of neutral transfers as follows:
Definition 13. The neutrality space K denotes the space of neutral transfers.
K = Eig(−1) ∩ 1⊥.
Roughly speaking, the neutrality space represents the policy constraints faced
by the social planner due to the network structure. In particular, the dimension
of the neutrality space tells us how many dimensions of potential transfers are
neutral. The link between the budget balance requirement and the vector 1
highlights the role of main eigenvalues in our analysis. A main eigenvalue is an
eigenvalue which has an associated eigenvector not orthogonal to the vector 1
(Cvetkovic, 1970), which are useful in our setting because the balanced budget
means that the transfer space is orthogonal to 1. The distinct main eigenvalues
of G form the main part of the spectrum, denoted by M (Harary and Schwenk,
1979).34
34By the Perron–Frobenius Theorem, the maximum eigenvalue of G has an associated
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Proposition 12. Let ψ(G) be the multiplicity of the −1 eigenvalue in the
spectrum of G. Then we have that
• −1 ∈M: dim(K) = ψ(G)− 1
• −1 /∈M: dim(K) = ψ(G)
Proof. Following from the discussion above, if −1 is a (distinct) main eigenvalue,
its eigenvector will not appear in the neutrality space. Therefore dim(K) has the
dimension of the eigenspace of the −1 eigenvalue(s) that is orthogonal to 1.
3.3.2 A structural characterisation
In the following we examine neutrality from a network architecture standpoint.
Definition 14 (Neighbourhood-homogenous35 subset). A subset of consumers S
is ‘neighbourhood homogenous’ if for any i, j in S it holds that
i ∪Ni = j ∪Nj.
For a network with S connected consumers who have the same neighbourhood,
the neighbourhood-homogenous subset has size |S|. Clearly, transfers between
such consumers will be neutral since members of S are not only fully connected,
but also indistinguishable in terms of their network position from the consumers
in N \ S. In the matrix I + G, the |S| rows and columns referring to
the neighbourhood-homogenous nodes are identical. This means that any
binary transfer that redistributes between two members of S is an eigenvector
eigenvector with all its entries positive and, therefore, is a main eigenvalue.
35For examples of neighbourhood-homogenous subsets, see Allouch (2015).
121
3. Redistribution in networks
corresponding to the eigenvalue −1 and hence neutral. If |S| = 2, there is
one neutral transfer available: between the pair; if |S| = 3 there are two
pairwise transfers from which any transfer vector involving members of S can be
constructed; and so on. So the dimension of neutral transfers that corresponds
to the neighbourhood-homogenous subset S is |S| − 1.
This means we have that |S| − 1 ≤ dim(K), showing us another way to find
that all transfers in a complete network are neutral. In this case, |S| = n and
so n − 1 ≤ dim(K). Since the maximum dimension of the neutrality space (K)
is n − 1 (the dimension of the transfer space), all transfers must be neutral in
complete networks.
3.3.3 Other neutral transfers
Of course, there could be other neutral transfers in the network as well as those
between members of a neighbourhood-homogenous subset. We have already
shown it suffices for a transfer to be an eigenvector corresponding to the −1
eigenvalue to be neutral, or equivalently, that the sum of transfers within each
neighbourhood is zero. An example of a neutral transfer without neighbourhood-
homogeneity is given in Figure 3.1. As described previously, neutral transfers
correspond to the eigenvector of the −1 eigenvalue; the eigensystem of this
network is
−1 1 0 −1 1
Figure 3.1: Neutral transfer but no subset is neighbourhood-homogenous
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λ5 = −
√















































Here we can observe that the transfer shown in Figure 3.1 is neutral, since
it is associated with the −1 eigenvalue. However, this transfer is not within a
subset of nodes that is neighbourhood-homogenous.36
Observe that a key policy implication of investigating neutrality in general
networks is that two seemingly unrelated transfers are policy equivalent (that is,
they lead to the same change in terms of private and public goods consumption) if
and only if their difference is a neutral transfer.37 For instance, the two transfers
in Figure 3.2 are policy equivalent, that is, they lead to the same change in
consumption, since their difference is the neutral transfer given in Figure 3.1.
3.4 Welfare impact of income redistribution
Having found that income redistribution can affect consumption, let us further
examine the potential welfare impact. Let v∗i denote the indirect utility
36Actually, there is no neighbourhood-homogenous subset in this network.
37Previous analysis in the case of pure public goods has mostly exploited the neighbourhood-
homogenous property of complete networks. That is, a redistribution between a subset of
contributors that leaves the set of contributors unchanged is neutral.
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−1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1
Figure 3.2: Policy equivalent transfers
function of the consumer i corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium at
the initial equilibrium, when the income distribution is w = (w1, . . . , wn)
T .
To be able to approximate welfare changes, we will focus our analysis on
transfers that are infinitesimal. The vector of indirect utilities of all consumers



















Proposition 13. The change in consumers’ utilities following an infinitesimal
transfer t is
∆v(t) = vt − v∗ ≈ Bv (I + G) t, (3.4.1)
where Bv is an invertible matrix.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let the impact space V be the space of utility changes that can be achieved
with budget-neutral transfers
V = {∆v(t) ∈ Rn | ∆v(t) = Bv(I + G)t for a t ∈ T}. (3.4.2)
Proposition 14. The dimension of the impact space is the dimension of the
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transfer space reduced by the dimension of the neutrality space: dim(V) =
n− 1− dim(K).
Proof. We know that dim(V) ≤ n− 1 since V is a transformation of T, which has
dimension n− 1 (due to budget balance). Next, we see that the extent to which
the dimension of V is further reduced with respect to T is equal to the dimension
of the neutrality space K, since transfers in this space are neutral and, hence, can
have no effect on utility.
Proposition 14 shows that even when neutrality does not hold, the network
architecture still determines, and actually reduces, the dimension of the impact
space.
Corollary 4. If a subset S is neighbourhood-homogenous then dim(V) ≤ n−|S|.
Proof. As discussed above we have that |S| − 1 ≤ dim(K). Combining this with
Proposition 14 gives the result.
We can also observe that if the public good is pure then dim(V) = 0. This is
because |S| = n in a complete network, the case for pure public goods. As we
mentioned before, we get the same result via the spectral characterisation.
In order to investigate the welfare impact of income distribution, we define a









i = r · v∗ (3.4.3)
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And the overall welfare effect of a set of transfers t is given by




r = r ·∆v(t) (3.4.4)
3.4.1 Pareto-improving reform
Next we investigate whether a Pareto-improving income redistribution exists.
Proposition 15. There are two mutually exclusive possibilities, (a) and (b).
(a) There exists a weakly Pareto-improving infinitesimal transfer t0, that is,
∆v(t0) ∈ Rn+ for t ∈ T
(b) There exist positive social welfare weights which render any policy change
welfare-neutral, that is, weights rM ∈ Rn++ such that
∆SW rM (t) = rM ·∆v(t) = 0, for all t ∈ T
Proof. Corollary 3′ of Ben-Israel (1964) states that, if L and L⊥ are
complementary orthogonal subspaces in Rn, then the following two statements
are equivalent:
L ∩ Rn+ = {0} and L⊥ ∩ Rn++ 6= ∅
Therefore, given V is a linear subspace, there are two mutually exclusive
possibilities, (a) and (b):
(a) V ∩ Rn+ 6= {0} ⇐⇒ V⊥ ∩ Rn++ = ∅
(b) V ∩ Rn+ = {0} ⇐⇒ V⊥ ∩ Rn++ 6= ∅
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If (a) then there exist weakly Pareto-improving transfers in the subspace V.
If (b) then weakly Pareto-improving transfers do not exist, and V⊥ is the
linear space of strictly positive welfare weights r that are orthogonal to ∆v(t),
giving ∆SW r(t) = r ·∆v(t) = 0 and thereby rendering any policy change neutral
in social welfare terms.
Proposition 15 shows that either a strict Pareto-improving income
redistribution can be found, or else the initial private provision equilibrium is
an optimum (amongst the private provision equilibria achieved by infinitesimal
income distributions). In the case of no possible Pareto improvement, the social
welfare weights, also known as Motzkin weights,38 represent the implicit welfare
weights at the initial equilibrium.
The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 15 is as follows: observe that the
impact space V determines whether or not a Pareto improvement is possible with
infinitesimal transfers in any network. If V intersects the non-negative orthant
then a Pareto improvement is possible, giving the list of non-negative utility
changes that result from the transfer. If V does not intersect the non-negative
orthant, then a Pareto improvement is not possible. At the same time V⊥ will
intersect the positive orthant, giving the positive implicit welfare weights of the
initial equilibrium.
Note that this terminology is not the same as in the previous discussion. Here
we use the term ‘welfare-neutral’ to distinguish it from the concept of ‘neutrality’
that we have been discussing so far. Welfare-neutrality is an aggregate concept,
38 The name of Motzkin weights originates from the application of Motzkin’s Theorem of the
Alternative to find Pareto-improving income redistributions for which income redistribution
is welfare-neutral. These weights also provide the inverse optimum (Ahmad and Stern, 1984;
Dixit, 1975).
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where there could be changes to individual consumption but these are offset by
other consumers’ consumption in the opposite direction, leaving aggregate welfare
unchanged. On the other hand neutrality means that consumption is unchanged.
Neutrality is sufficient but not necessary for welfare-neutrality to hold.
3.5 Welfare in example networks
We now examine some example networks, using the simple case of Cobb-Douglas




i . As we will see, in view of the homogeneity
of preferences, the feasibility of welfare-improving reform will depend greatly on
the network structure.
Proposition 16. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the change in consumers’ utility
from an income redistribution t is as follows, where α = aa(1− a)(1−a)
vt − v∗ = α(I + aG)−1(I + G)t. (3.5.1)
The overall welfare effect of transfers t in the C-D case is given by
∆SW r(t) = r ·∆v(t) (3.5.2)
= αrT (I + aG)−1(I + G)t. (3.5.3)
Proof. See Appendix.
Given this expression, we can now easily find either the vector of non-negative
utility changes in V that characterise a Pareto improvement due to transfers, or
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the Motzkin weights (defined earlier) in V⊥, the normal to the impact space. In
particular,
Corollary 5. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, if −1 is a main eigenvalue then
there exists a Pareto improvement.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next we look at some example networks; of particular interest are core-
periphery networks, defined by Borgatti and Everett (2000). In core-periphery
networks there are two groups of consumers, the centre C and the periphery P .
Nodes in C are completely connected to each other, and may be connected to
nodes in P , while nodes in P are only connected to nodes in C and not connected
to each other. Networks of this type have many applications such as information-
sharing, where consumers in the core share the cost of information collection,
which is then accessed by the periphery (Galeotti and Goyal, 2010). Other
examples could be spatial or geographical, for example central and suburban
residences in a town or city, or financial, such as liquidity networks (Elliott et al.,
2014).
3.5.1 Star network
The simplest core-periphery network has only one central consumer: the star
network. The star network with two periphery consumers is shown in Figure 3.1
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Figure 3.1: The star network of three nodes
and the eigensystem is
λ3 = −
√




















We can observe immediately that there are no neutral transfers in this
network, since −1 is not an eigenvalue. Let us designate the two periphery
players as 2 and 3 and the central player as 1, with transfers of t = (t1, t2, t3).
Since these must be budget-balanced, let t1 = −t2 − t3. Then we can write the





 = 11− 2a2

a(t2 + t3)
−a2t2 − (1− a2)t3
−a2t3 − (1− a2)t2
 (3.5.4)
We can make two observations from (3.5.4). Firstly, if transfers to the
periphery players are positive, this increases the utility of the central player and
decreases the utility of the periphery. For each consumer, transfers to themselves
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have a negative effect on their utility (for player 1, this effect can be written as
−at1). This is called a transfer paradox because the effect on utility is opposite
to the direction of transfer. In fact, this is a strong transfer paradox because the
opposite direction of change occurs for both players — those who give and receive
transfers.
The intuition for the transfer paradox is as follows. As shown previously, the
change in utility of each agent is an increasing function of their social wealth,
wi + Q−i. So there are two ways that utility is affected by transfers. First,
at the new equilibrium after transfers to the centre, wealth wi changes by ti
and so the centre has more private wealth and the periphery has less. Second,
neighbourhood public good provision Q−i is also different at the new equilibrium.
The periphery agents contribute less public good at the new equilibrium, while
the centre increases his provision. This means that the neighbourhood provision
of the periphery Q−2 = Q−3 = q1 increases, and that of the centre Q−1 = q2 + q3
decreases. So for both periphery and centre, the two effects of the transfers on
social wealth wi + Q−i move in different directions. In the case of the star, the
net effect on the central agent’s social wealth is negative, and on the periphery
agents is positive: hence there is a strong transfer paradox.
Secondly, (3.5.4) shows us that there is no Pareto improvement available in
the star network, since we can observe that it is not possible that all three entries
in the vector of utilities could be positive, for any budget-balanced transfers. This
means that we can find the Motzkin weights as the normal to the impact space:




3 ) = (1, a, a).
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Figure 3.2: The balanced network of six nodes
3.5.2 Balanced network
Our second example is the larger core-periphery network shown in Figure 3.2.
The eigensystem is





















































We observe from the eigensystem that although there is a −1 eigenvalue,
this does not allow the possibility of neutral transfers because the associated
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eigenvector is not budget neutral.39 So there are no neutral transfers in this
network. The neutrality space has dimension zero, and that of the impact space
is its maximum at n− 1 = 5.
As there are no neutral transfers, this means that any budget-balanced
transfers will have an impact on individual utilities. There are two possibilities.
If all the utility changes are non-negative this would be a Pareto improvement.
Necessarily, the aggregate effect on welfare would be non-negative. On the other
hand, if some of the utility changes are negative and some positive, then the
overall impact could be welfare-neutral if the utility changes are weighted by
the Motzkin weights, in which case the positive and negative impacts offset each
other.
We are interested in whether a Pareto improvement exists or not, and we
can find an example of a Pareto improvement in the simple case that follows.
First we designate players 1 and 2 as the central nodes and 3, 4, 5 and 6 as the
periphery nodes. Let transfers to the centre be tc = t1 = t2 and transfers to the
periphery be tp = t3 = t4 = t5 = t6. Budget balance requires that tc = −2tp.
Then the utility changes of the central nodes and periphery nodes, ∆vc(t) and








We can observe from (3.5.5) that in this network, there is always a Pareto
improvement when transfers to the centre are positive. In particular, we cannot
39Observe that −1 is a main eigenvalue as the associated eigenvector is not orthogonal to 1.
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increase the welfare of the periphery without increasing that of the centre at
double the rate. We term the central players in this network ‘welfare winners’
because they will always gain from any attempt to increase aggregate welfare. In
fact, this is an example of a weak transfer paradox because some consumers —
here the periphery — gains in utility terms even though they are losing in income
terms by paying a transfer to the centre.
It is interesting to note that the ‘balanced’ network in Figure 3.2 can be
formed by joining together the centre nodes of two of the star networks shown in
Figure 3.1. In this case, the centre is no longer worse off at the new equilibrium -
we have a Pareto improvement and a weak rather than strong transfer paradox.
This is because of the impact of the transfers on social wealth. With the balanced
network, the centre’s neighbourhood provision is Q−c = qc + 2qp, whereas in the
star network it is Q−c = 2qp. The fact that the centre nodes in the balanced
network can benefit from each others’ increased public good provision means
that their utility increases in the new equilibrium after transfers, leading to a
Pareto improvement.
It is interesting to note that the direction of utility changes are not affected by
preferences via the parameter a. And since there are Pareto-improving transfers
for this network, the Motzkin weights do not exist.
3.6 Conclusion
We investigate the welfare impact of lump-sum income redistribution on
individuals who privately provide public goods in networks. We fully characterise
the possible directions of optimal policy reform by using general welfare
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weights. As usual, understanding the architecture of the network has important
implications for policy reform in networks. We find that neutrality is associated
with the eigenvalue −1 and leads to a change of sign of policy. Unlike Allouch
(2015) and Allouch (2017) which focus on network architectures that are not
amenable to a neutrality (-like) results in the tradition of BBV, our analysis shows
that even when neutrality fails to hold, the impact of income redistribution is still
hampered by the architecture. We find that income redistributions in networks
with local public goods can be Pareto-improving, and if not, it identifies implicit
social welfare weights of the initial equilibrium, invoking Motzkin’s Theorem of
the Alternative. Examples of core-periphery networks illustrate some features of
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Appendix
3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 11
From Allouch (2015) we have that 40
qt − q∗ = (I + AG)−1(I−A)t (3.A.5)
40The proof in Allouch (2015) is as follows. From (3.2.3), it follows that for each consumer
i ∈ C
qti − q∗i = (γi(wi + ti +Qt−i)−Qt−i)− (γi(wi +Q∗−i)−Q∗−i) (3.A.1)
= γi(wi + ti +Q
t
−i)− γi(wi +Q∗−i)− (Qt−i −Q∗−i) (3.A.2)
From the mean value theorem, we have that (b − a)f ′(c) = f(b) − f(a) for a < b and
c ∈]a, b[, when f is continuous and differentiable. So it follows that for each i ∈ C such
that ti +Q
t
−i 6= Q∗−i, there exists a real number βi ∈](wi +Q∗−i), (wi + ti +Qt−i)[ such that
γ′i(βi)(ti +Q
t
−i −Q∗−i) = γi(wi + ti +Qt−i)− γi(wi +Q∗−i)
On the other hand if for i ∈ C we have ti +Qt−i = Q∗−i, this means that γi(wi + ti +Qt−i)−
γi(wi +Q
∗
−i) = 0. Let βi = wi +Q
∗
−i; then for each consumer i ∈ C it holds that
qti − q∗i = γ′i(βi)(ti +Qt−i −Q∗−i)− (Qt−i −Q∗−i) (3.A.3)
qti − q∗i + (1− γ′i(βi))(Qt−i −Q∗−i) = γ′i(βi)ti (3.A.4)
Consequently, it holds that
(I + AG)(qt − q∗) = (I−A)t,
where A = diag(1 − γ′i(βi))i∈C . Applying Lemma 1 (Allouch, 2015) for B = A and U = I,
it follows that I + AG is invertible since it has positive eigenvalues. Hence, qt − q∗ =
(I + AG)−1(I−A)t.
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where A = diag(1−γ′i(βi))i∈N for some βi and t = (ti)i∈N . We can now calculate
the changes in private and public good consumption from (3.A.5). We know that
xt − x∗ + qt − q∗ = t, so
xt − x∗ = t− (qt − q∗)
= t− (I + AG)−1(I−A)t
= [I− (I + AG)−1(I−A)]t
= [(I + AG)−1(I + AG)− (I + AG)−1(I−A)]t
= (I + AG)−1[(I + AG)− (I−A)]t
= (I + AG)−1A(I + G)t (3.A.6)
Meanwhile we also know that Qt −Q∗ = (I + G)(qt − q∗) so we have that
Qt −Q∗ = (I + G)(qt − q∗) = (I + G)[t− (xt − x∗)]
= (I + G)[t− (I + AG)−1A(I + G)t]
= (I + G)t− (I + G)(I + AG)−1A(I + G)t
= [I− (I + G)(I + AG)−1A](I + G)t
= [A−1(I + AG)− (I + G)](I + AG)−1A(I + G)t
= [A−1 − I](I + AG)−1A(I + G)t as required.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 13
First, from the proof of Proposition 11, we have that
Qti −Q∗i = [A−1 − I](xti − x∗i )
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(xti − x∗i ) (3.A.7)





i )− ui(x∗i , Q∗i ) ≈
∂ui
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(xti − x∗i ) +
∂ui
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(xti − x∗i )(3.A.9)
Since we normalised prices to (1, 1), and assumed an interior solution where














(xti − x∗i ) (3.A.10)
Let ∇u = diag(∂ui
∂xi
). Then
vt − v∗ ≈ ∇u A−1(I + AG)−1A(I + G)t.
So that Bv = ∇u A−1(I + AG)−1A, which is invertible as required.
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 16
Following from (3.A.5) in the case of C-D preferences, the change in consumers’
public good provision due to an infinitesimal transfer t is given by
qt − q∗ = (1− a)(I + aG)−1t
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Let Q− be the vector of Q−i; now we can observe that
Qt− −Q∗− = (1− a)G(I + aG)−1t
In the Cobb-Douglas case, where α = aa(1− a)(1−a) the indirect utility function
is
v∗i = α(wi +Q
∗
−i) (3.A.11)
So the list of changes in utility from lump-sum transfers t is
vt − v∗ = [ui(xti , qti +Qt−i)− ui(x∗i , q∗i +Q∗−i)]i∈N






= α[G(qt − q∗) + It]































(I + aG)−1[(I + aG)− (1− a)I]t
= α(I + aG)−1(I + G)t.
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3.A.4 Proof of Corollary 5
Observe that since −1 is a main eigenvalue there exists a transfer t0 = κu1 +βul,
where u1 is the eigenvector corresponding to λmax and ul is the eigenvector
corresponding to −1, and κ, β 6= 0. This is not the case if −1 is a non-main
eigenvalue, because then ul would be orthogonal to 1, and so adding the all-
positive u1 to it would not lead to budget-balanced transfers. On the other
hand, if ul is not orthogonal to 1, since u1 and ul are orthogonal, they span a
hyperplane which must intersect the n− 1 space of 1⊥ at some point, giving the
budget-balanced transfer for some κ, β. From 3.5.1 it follows that
vt − v∗ = α(I + aG)−1(I + G)t0 (3.A.12)
= α(I + aG)−1(I + G)(κu1 + βul) (3.A.13)
= α(I + aG)−1(I + G)κu1 + α(I + aG)
−1(I + G)βul(3.A.14)
= α(1 + λ1)/(1 + aλ1)κu1 (3.A.15)
So in this case the impact of the transfer is results in a Pareto improvement.
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